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IMPLICATION ANALYSIS: A PRAGMATIC PROPOSAL FOR LINKING THEORY AND DATA IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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Sociology and other social sciences struggle to emulate a model of scientific evidence that is often inappropriate. Not only do social researchers encounter special limits, but they are also handicapped by a distorted and idealized picture of practices in the "hard sciences." Ironically, while often obliged to use data of lower quality, sociology employs standards for evaluating a theory that are not attained in the hard sciences. After a brief review of these obstacles, we describe a set of procedures for using empirical data to rigorously evaluate theories and hypotheses without resorting

to the mimicking of hard science. The interaction between theory and evidence normally involves deriving implications from the theory (usually referred to as hypotheses) and then ascertaining how closely the empirical evidence meets these implications. The appropriateness of the implications is a key factor in the entire operation, linking as they do the data and the theory. The evaluation of a theory is no better than the theory's implications (as generated by the investigator) coupled with the quality and appropriateness of the evidence. It is our impression, however, that because this step is insufficiently addressed, there are unnecessary problems in the evaluation of theories. We use the term "Implication Analysis" to describe our efforts to review and improve current procedures.

1. INTRODUCTION

Before turning to what we call "Implication Analysis," we begin with the central assumptions and observations leading to the development of alternative ways of using data to evaluate theories:

1. We assume that social processes are reasonably orderly and knowable and, in turn, that empirical evidence can help us evaluate theories that claim to explain these social processes.
2. Our data and methods are imperfect. Given the subject matters of sociology and other social sciences, the imperfections are often substantial—rather than merely modest departures from the ideal.
3. The linkage between theory and evidence is far more difficult than we want it to be (as is often the case with the way the social sciences are taught and the assumptions under which we operate), and the practitioner has to deal with this reality. Assuming we do not want to just give up on social science, we have to develop what may appear to be an oxymoron: a more rigorous approach using imperfect data and methods. Otherwise, we are *playing* at being a science of society—as opposed to *being* one.
4. On the one hand, it is almost certain that no single study will validate or invalidate a theory. On the other hand, there is a good chance that a large number of studies will not generate consistent results.
5. If the perfect is the enemy of the good, we want to figure out how to do research that provides as rigorous an approach as possible while recognizing the limitations that social research often encounters.

6. We embrace the role of researcher talent. Social science methodology is not about developing a foolproof system; it is at least partly an art. There is no mechanical system that will escape judgment, sense, and intelligence. But this does not eliminate the need for techniques and standards.

7. Our analysis of implications is stimulated by Fisher's brief comment on observational data, reported and elaborated decades later by Cochran (1965), and the elegant epidemiological research on the influence of cigarette smoking on lung cancer. Implication Analysis searches for as many consequences of a theory as possible and seeks in turn to find evidence to evaluate these consequences. There is a particularly appealing feature of this approach in which the full ramification of a theory is considered: It frees the researchers and theorists from worrying about whether everything "works." We rid ourselves of inappropriate notions of what results should look like if the theory is "true" or what it should look like if the theory is "false." And this should enable us to come to terms with our evidence and deal with the results in a more reasonable and appropriate way.

2. IMPLICATION ANALYSIS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Simply put: Evaluation in the social sciences commonly entails deriving implications from a theory (usually in the form of hypotheses) and then in turn ascertaining how closely the empirical evidence meets these implications.[1] We use the term "Implication Analysis" to describe our efforts to review and improve current procedures. Typically, implications are derived from the theory in order to develop empirical questions about the consequences of the theory. As such, implications are a central step in this process—a bridge between the theory and the data. The appropriateness of the implications is a key factor in the entire operation, linking as they do the data and the theory. However, the steps involved in going from theory to hypothesis are insufficiently addressed. Likewise, the widely understood difficulties in data analysis also create problems for generating an appropriate empirical evaluation. In other words, the ideal notion about how theory and data should interact is

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[1] For further discussion of hypotheses, see Cohen (1934:202–7), Seawright and Collier (2004:289, 304), and Quine and Ullian (1978:66, 108).

just that—an *ideal*. Indeed, it by no means holds for all of the operations in the hard sciences as well.

Compared to tests of significance, there are relatively few rules and understandings about the generation of implications, their measurement, and in turn the evaluation of the theory. Are the implications true to the theory's intent? Are the data appropriate? What should be done when there are contradictory results? Or, put differently, how does it come about that contradictory results are obtained? Are there procedures that might help us decide? Are there some theories that are more appropriate than others for deriving implications? Obviously, this is a huge topic and entails various considerations, not all of which will be novel for any reader. Although we review various facets of this process, this paper should be seen as a starting point toward developing appropriate ways of analyzing implications and thereby improving our use of evidence. We will consider the logic of implications, the severe obstacles in appropriately evaluating these implications with less-than-ideal data, the problems due to the data we are customarily obliged to use, a more realistic and different metaphor for evaluating the evidence, and a variety of steps that should be considered in the evaluation of conflicting evidence. Our goal, in all respects, is to describe positive and useful procedures that should enhance the analysis of implications.

Ni Bhrolcháin and Dyson (2007) provide a remarkable paper on causation in demography. Of special interest to us is a set of ten criteria for evaluating causal inference in the study of demographic change, as presented in Figure 1. It is included as having potential value as a set of implicit standards for evaluating not only a theory but also hypotheses generated from a theory. To the degree that the implication does not meet these standards, there is an increasing reason for questioning the implication and in turn the importance attached to the study. Of course, as we noted at the outset, there may be good reasons for the implication to not meet these standards. As already noted, there is a matter of judgment as to when such rules are inappropriate.

Figure 1 is an excellent set of standards to initially think about a theory—although a theory should not be rejected out of hand if there is failure in one of the standards. But we do want to comment about one type of theory—broad in its nature but very difficult to apply, let alone evaluate, in terms of its implications. Karl Popper is persuasive in questioning theories that include a series of chains or mechanisms leading to an outcome:

FIGURE 1.
Criteria supportive of causal inference regarding demographic change

Criterion	Description
1. Time order	The cause should precede the effect; or, where a process is cumulative, the start of the cause should precede the start of the effect. Simultaneous causation is possible in relation to mechanical processes.
2. Contiguity	The shorter the time between the cause and the effect, the stronger the basis for causal inference. Lags are possible, and may even be necessary, but they must be explained.
3. Duration	Causal inference is strengthened where the effect continues during the entire period in which the cause is operating. Not always applicable—causes of very short duration may have longer-lasting effects, and some processes may be irreversible.
4. Distinctiveness	Causal inference is more straightforward where both cause and effect are clearly differentiated and identifiable in a temporal context. True causes and effects may be hard to isolate from surrounding variability. Analogous to Bradford Hill's strength criterion, but distinctive effects may not be large and vice versa.
5. Direction	The effect should be in the expected direction—i.e., would the effect and its direction have been predicted before the event? Unexpected effects may occur and expected effects may be hard to specify. Analogous to Bradford Hill's plausibility criterion.
6. Proportionality	Causal linkage is better grounded when the scale of the effect can be considered proportional to the scale of the cause. Need not always apply—the criterion is subjective: apparently small causes can have major effects, and the reverse may also hold.

continued

FIGURE 1.
Continued

7. Recurrence	Causal inference is strengthened if the linkage occurs in a variety of settings. Context may, however, preclude exact replication.
	Not essential—some causes are historically unique.
	Analogous to Bradford Hill's consistency criterion.
8. No cause	Where the putative cause is absent, the effect is absent too.
	May not always apply in that multiple causes of a given event are possible.
9. Mechanism	To establish a causal link, a plausible set of intermediate links is required showing how the cause brings about the effect.
	Specifying and providing evidence of the mechanism involved is essential.
10. No alternative	All reasonable alternative explanations, including confounding, must be considered and ruled out. This criterion is simpler to satisfy where effects are large and distinctive.
	What is considered a reasonable alternative may change through time.

> ...although we may assume that an actual succession of phenomena proceeds according to the laws of nature, it is important to realize that practically *no sequence of, say, three or more causally connected concrete events proceeds according to any single law of nature*. If the wind shakes a tree and Newton's apple falls...nobody will deny that these events can be described in terms of causal laws. But there is no single law, such as that of gravity, nor even a single definite set of laws, to described the actual or concrete succession of causally connected events; apart from gravity, we should have to consider the laws explaining wind pressure;...movement of the branch;...tension in the apple's stalk...The idea that any concrete sequence or succession of events (apart from such examples as the movement of a pendulum or solar system) can be described or explained by any one law, or by any one definite set of laws, is simply mistaken. There are neither laws of succession, nor laws of evolution. (1964:115)

If there is a mildly complex set of mechanisms, then the implications should be explicitly evaluated in appropriate piecemeal fashion. Otherwise, an implication will be almost certain to fail.

2.1. *Out of Context*

Virtually all theories in the social sciences can be shown to generate implications that will prove to be false. Why is this the case? First, most social theories are verbal statements, and no matter how precise the statements are, it is possible to take words and sentences out of context or out of the intended meaning and thereby generate an implication that is patently false. Beyond this, theories make assumptions that are not fully stated but are commonly understood. These assumptions are called *submerged statements*, "a set of conditions, limitations, definitions, contexts, and other modifications of what is literally being said that are—if communication is to work—understood by the receiver" (Lieberson 1998:186).

Consider how we might address an implication derived from a simple logical statement that does not require messy empirical evidence. If we start with a theory that all humans are mortal, then this would imply that all immortals are not human. How can this be? Clearly, the problem lies in the inherent difficulties that we have with language. To wit, the meaning of "immortal" is used to mean *not subject to biological death* rather than *someone with lasting fame*. This is obvious, and therefore someone deriving such an implication is applying a literal meaning without regard to the context of its intent. Probably most readers have encountered this type of situation, where someone makes a statement that is then taken out of context and thereby appears to be disproved (either because the context is not understood or just to be argumentative).

2.2. *Expansion*

This leads us to a sociological issue that is something of paradox. Let us start with two characteristics: the nature of the data set and the nature of the implication. If the conclusions are different between two studies that use the same data to evaluate the same implication, then most likely the paradoxical issue can be addressed through a tight examination of the research procedures. At the other extreme, where the two studies differ in both the implication derived from the theory and the data applied, it will take considerable effort to make sense of the outcome—particularly if either different hypotheses generate the same outcome or if the same hypothesis generates different outcomes. But, in any case, these are potentially manageable problems. It will be necessary to judge the appropriateness of the different hypotheses derived from the same theory. Likewise, it will be necessary to examine the differences in the data and procedures when there are different conclusions about the same hypothesis. In some cases, there will be clear problems about the implication or about the data or about the procedures, and this should be workable. In other cases, there will be no reconciliation between the research groups. Now what? Here we get into a sociological process. If the topic is an important one, ultimately others will be drawn into the problem and certain threads will begin to appear, such that the sources of the differences will be progressively understood. It is likely to stem

from outside parties. If the problem is important enough and lingers long enough, then a new cohort of social scientists will enter into the fray and the issue will be resolved.

Of course, it is heartening when the conclusions are the same— particularly when the data are different. Researchers may tilt in a certain direction about a given theory. And this may lead to using data for which the researcher has an a *priori* expectation that the chosen data will be especially likely to support or contradict the theory. Some of this danger, which can occur in good conscience, can be worked out by a process of reducing researcher bias as best as possible. Suppose the implications of a theory work very nicely for a given nation. The question is how does the theory work for several other nations? Implication Analysis requires that choice of additional nations be done in a manner to reduce a bias, to wit, with some form of randomization. In many cases, this is not possible because the quality of the data for different countries may be radically different. But a set of nations with suitable data should be generated and then randomly selected. The set from which the choices were made should be reported so that the reader can evaluate whether it suggests an inappropriate tilt. This notion of justifying the choice would apply to quantitative data sets as well—if more than one were reasonably appropriate.

We suggest that the researchers justify their selection of the data to evaluate the implication drawn from the theory, the outcomes, or, say, different countries, and so forth. But what if they are not? There are several considerations when different data generate different conclusions about a similar implication, or when the same data generate different conclusions about the same implication. The latter problem involves issues of replication. (What is the source of the different conclusions: statistical methods used? coding procedures? models? assumptions and so forth?)[2] If the parties responsible for these differences cannot resolve the problem, then there is a very nice social solution. If the issue is important, third parties will address it and—although it may also lead to a lack of agreement—over time there will hopefully be some consensus such that there is an understanding about how analyses of the same data

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[2] We call the reader's attention to a discussion of this topic in the "Special Section on Replication and Data Access" of *Sociological Methods and Research* (2007, 36(2):151–219).

generated different conclusions and, in turn, which conclusion is more reasonable or—at least—if some truth can be found in both (the latter generating further understanding of the theory).

Ignoring the messy problems of data and evidence, several logical considerations are in order. If the evidence fails to support a theory, it does not follow that the theory is false. The implication drawn from a theory may have been incorrect, or the data of poor quality, or the bounds of the theory inadequately drawn. And, of course, if the results are based on only one or two cases, the evidence may be insufficient—if we recognize that the theory is a probabilistic theory. On the other hand, if the evidence supports the implications of the theory, we have to consider whether another theory would have generated the same outcome. Finally, a theory may be false, even if the results are congruent with the hypothesis (which is an appropriate implication). This is because the theory may be in error—even if in the specific case the outcome is correctly implied. These problems exist, but they should not be severe if the theory's implication is examined under a variety of contexts. In that circumstance, it becomes highly unlikely that a "true" theory will be persistently rejected or a "false" one persistently accepted.

Keep in mind, if the evidence for a theory is inconclusive, the absence of the affirmation does not necessarily mean that the theory is either false or valid—it means that we do not know. There are other plausible interpretations besides a poorly generated hypothesis that partially, but not fully, reflects the theory's implication. First of all, the data may be of poor quality—certainly a common issue. Also, the effect implied by the theory is drowned by the influence of contrary forces. Undoubtedly, there are many potential theories that cannot be appropriately evaluated for a variety of reasons: variables that are hard to measure in a suitable manner; social taboos; uncommon phenomena such that routine social research procedures will generate only a small number of cases.

Finally, it is important to distinguish between a *theory* and an *explanation* offered to account for a specific observation. Explanations may be based on a theory or simply suggest a theory, but no theory can be evaluated on its ability to account for an observation. Indeed it is difficult to provide suitable explanations for a specific event. If we ask why teenagers drop out of high school before graduating, there are a variety of valid explanations that can be offered. But if we ask why Mike or Jennie dropped out, the best that we can expect is a probabilistic

explanation unless the researcher knows an enormous amount about the child. And, even then, it would be a probabilistic statement. Indeed, this is probably a major difficulty that sociology and social science—more generally—face: an expectation from the public that is actually, in its specific nature, very hard to achieve.

2.3. *Limits*

It is one matter to believe that there are theories that will operate throughout time and space. We do not have to worry about the first belief since we can accept the theory as true, but essentially irrelevant in a vast number of conditions where its influence is virtually nil. But it is another matter to believe that there are all-powerful theories operating with such force that they will make their presence felt regardless of countervailing conditions. The latter is unlikely. As a consequence, we become interested in the limits of a theory. Under what circumstances can we expect it to operate such that we can observe its implications and, in turn, under what circumstances can we expect its influence to be muted such that implications are for all purposes absent?

In either case, we need to know the conditions under which the implications of a theory might be expected to operate, in the sense of generating observable outcomes. And, of course, in knowing these limits, we also know where the implications do not appear—or if we visualize this as on a continuum, where the impact becomes progressively weaker.

Most theories do not state the necessary conditions under which the implications of the theory are relevant or visible. Put another way, we start with the belief that a theory does not always "work," in the sense that its implications do not always occur, nor do we have reason to think they should always occur. This reflects not just the usual issue for a probabilistic theory (a matter that we certainly accept as one reason for inconsistency in observations), but the implications will fail to appear in the absence of necessary conditions. It is easy to see this in any theory with an important quantitative dimension. For example, does alcohol consumption among teenagers affect their attitude toward school? We may have a theory that it does but not find that the theory matters for students who rarely drink. The theory has implications that are generally true, but there are limits to its effect. This is easy to see because

it is a quantitative theory. The point, though, is that we can expect theories to have conditions under which the implications operate and other conditions under which they will not operate. Learning the limits through empirical study is all right, albeit sluggish, and also may lead to artificial *ad hoc* bounds that have no rhyme or reason. In short, theorists should make some effort to estimate the theory's limits. But if they fail to do so, it is necessary to keep in mind this almost certain limitation.

3. BACKGROUND: THE REAL WORLD OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Admittedly, social science data often have special problems. But the standards and procedures used to link the data with theory are often *unnecessarily* shaky and unconvincing—even after taking into account these difficulties. This leads to the somewhat counterintuitive notion that current standards of evidence will reject theories that should be accepted and those same standards will lead us to accept theories that should be rejected. Note: the focus here is with *epistemological* errors caused when conventional procedures are inappropriate for connecting data with the theory. This is different from Type I and Type II Errors generated in significance tests; we are not concerned with this important and well-understood *statistical* issue. Likewise, in discussing theories that *should have been rejected* or *should have been accepted*, we concur with Hill (1965:300): "all scientific work is incomplete—whether it be observational or experimental. All scientific work is liable to be upset or modified by advancing knowledge." Again, we are not discussing an erroneous conclusion due to observations and theories that were unknown at the time. These errors should be self-correcting when new information is available. Rather we refer here to erroneous conclusions unnecessarily caused by the use of improper standards in the analysis of existing data.

Why do we expect contemporary standards to often reject valuable theories and accept useless theories? Our point is illustrated by two radically different examples. First, visualize a widely studied theory, with extensive research data. There is no problem if the results either consistently support or consistently reject the theory. However, for reasons that we develop later, there is a good chance that not all of the results will generate a consistent conclusion. In the absence of consistency, a

variety of conclusions is possible. For theorists and researchers who operate with the mistaken expectation that an empirical "test" should provide a clear answer about a theory (hopefully a small number), then the conclusion would be that the theory is falsified because the theory cannot explain some of the results. If so, should a new theory be proposed that will incorporate all of the results? Or, in order to support a favored theory, should contradictory evidence be ignored? Or should the solution be based on the majority of the results, such that the theory receiving the most empirical support is judged to be "correct"? Without an understanding of the standards to be followed, a case can be made for any of these conclusions. We observe contradictory results and do not know which conclusion may appear to be more justifiable than others. The evidence does not provide as much information as we have a right to expect, granted that the data are almost certain to have some problems. The set of procedures that we follow is incomplete. The ambiguities raised by contradictory results are often swept under the rug—thanks to the "theory testing" broom such that any contradictory result is taken to mean that the theory is wrong. In any case, we simply have no clearly stated procedure. Although a rigid rule might itself be damaging, somehow we should have more of an *a priori* understanding of what is required.

The second example stems from the opposite situation: The empirical evidence is strikingly consistent in either supporting or contradicting the theory, but it is insufficient to justify a strong conclusion and, at best, the results are promising. Here the problem occurs when the results are *over interpreted*. To understand the importance of this caution, consider the constant flow of pharmaceutical studies that report an initial positive outcome for a new drug but then are reversed after further testing and analysis. In short, these two radically different situations illustrate our assertion that sociology—and the social sciences in general—have failed to develop rigorous standards for evaluating the results.

Moreover, a void in epistemological rules creates an ambiguous situation that can subtly tip the interpretation of the evidence toward the investigator's beliefs and dispositions. The outcome often resembles a debate, with "telling" points and observations tossed back and forth and the conclusions becoming a function not only of the strength of the evidence but also of rhetorical skills. (For a discussion of the disconnect between theory and evidence in economics, see McCloskey 1998). This is

discouraging for both social scientists and consumers of social science—particularly for those who share our assumption that social processes are orderly and knowable.

4. SPECIAL OBSTACLES IN THE USE OF EVIDENCE

We briefly review three particularly important obstacles in the use of evidence in evaluating theories:

4.1. *A Counterproductive Model of the Hard Sciences*

Sociology and other social sciences struggle with a distorted image of the hard sciences that is not only an inappropriate model but includes standards that are even more stringent than those used in most of the hard sciences. The image of hard sciences employing a straightforward *test* that leads to a hard and firm evaluation of a theory's validity is false and harmful for social science. Yet the language of sociology is full of this hard science imagery. Sociology, for example, employs such notions as "testing" a theory to see if it is true; or "controlling" for various conditions in evaluating a theory, as we might do in dealing with manageable inanimate objects or biological specimens. There is the expectation that a theory—if it is valid—is able to "predict" future and unknown events. Indeed, prediction is a test of the "power" of a theory. Even more complex is the expectation that we should be able to *choose* between competing theories simply by finding a situation where they predict different outcomes. (It is never quite clear, by the way, what to do if neither predicts correctly, let alone if Theory A does better in one test and B in another.) When the two theories correctly predict the same outcomes repeatedly, we in turn employ parsimony to choose between them, again following the solution we attribute to hard science.

        Ironically, the hard sciences rarely use such a simplistic standard; a conclusion about the utility of a theory rarely stems from a single study or even several studies. Perhaps this image originates from the way natural science is (or was) taught in elementary and secondary schools—as if one experiment could lead to the rejection of phlogiston theory; or another experiment could toss Lamarck's theory of inheritance of

acquired characteristics into a garbage can. In practice, it can be difficult to simply generate the necessary data to evaluate a theory, let alone have sufficient confidence in the results. Witness, for example, the obstacles faced in properly comparing the prediction derived from Newtonian physics with the prediction stemming from Einstein's general theory of relativity (Lieberson 1992). To be sure, the set of worldwide astronomical observations based on the eclipse of 1919 favored Einstein's prediction over Newton's (Mayo 1996). However, the conclusion involved more than simple comparisons between the observations and the expectations generated by the theories—indeed these results alone were disputed and reinterpreted by some who questioned whether Einstein's theory was the cause of the reported observations. According to Mayo's review of the evidence, the matter was settled because Einstein's theory could explain not only the astronomical observations but also Kepler's third law, *and* the motion of Mercury's path.

In similar fashion, the interplay between theory, implications, and evidence is more casual in the hard sciences. In practice, prediction in the hard sciences is often different from, and less rigid than, the social scientist's tighter view of prediction (Brush 2003). The role of intuition is more openly acknowledged in the hard sciences and the distinction between deduction and induction is much more fuzzy. Formal rules of evidence such as those described by Mill (1874) are seen as relevant only for the early stages of a science (see Holton 2004) In any case, the assumption of a tight linkage between theory and evidence makes no sense for the social scientist who typically must deal with an enormous range of conditions that not only may have an impact on the outcome but may even overpower the consequence anticipated by a specific theory. (And the data are sometimes problematic, to boot.) Consequently, many of the procedures social scientists use for empirical evaluation of theories are inappropriate.

4.2. *Excessive Reliance on the Experimental Model*

Given the view of experimental evidence as the "gold standard" for evaluating and testing theories in the natural sciences, it is not surprising that the experimental model profoundly affects expectations about the way data and evidence should operate in the social sciences. The language of experimentation is often employed even when true experimentation

is not possible for ethical or practical reasons. There is a widespread tendency to employ various statistical procedures to approximate the conclusions that an experiment would have produced. This is understandable and is often successful. But it is problematic on two important counts. First, many natural sciences do very nicely without relying *exclusively* on experiments (for example, evolution, meteorology, many aspects of astronomy, and geology). Observational data play a major role in generating a high level of confidence in the evaluation of a theory. Witness, for instance, the important role observational evidence played in the comparison between Einstein's and Newton's theories (albeit recall from our earlier discussion that these astronomical observations based on a solar eclipse were not the only basis for favoring Einstein). Or consider Darwin's reliance on observational data in developing and expounding the theory of evolution (Lieberson and Lynn 2002). The potential for such rigorous knowledge is both underappreciated and underutilized in social science. However, the use of observational data should not be confused with the questionable disposition to appropriate Mill's methods to social processes in a helter-skelter fashion.[3]

Since true experiments are simply undoable in many areas of social research, alternatives are often necessary. But even when randomized experiments appear to be possible, the results are often compromised. For instance, randomized experiments employed to evaluate drugs, procedures, and diets often generate inconsistent and misleading results. These obstacles tell us a lot about randomized experiments in the social sciences because the randomized health studies usually benefit from better financing and are probably easier to perform than most social experiments. Among the obstacles observed by Nowak (1994) in her review of clinical trials are the following: The number of subjects are too small to detect treatment differences; subjects drop out before the study is completed, thereby complicating the possible inferences; there is an absence of true randomization because experimenters fail to follow the indicated protocol (to say nothing of using an improper protocol); there is improper inclusion of subjects for whom the experiment is irrelevant or improper, which impacts on the estimated magnitude of the test

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[3] Indeed, in a section widely ignored by practitioners of these methods, Mill (1874:608–13) demonstrates the inappropriateness of the Method of Difference, the Method of Agreement, and the Method of Residues for understanding social processes.

effect; populations of subjects are non-randomly chosen either because of exclusion rules *or* because of non-random assignment to the test and control population; and pressure is exerted by subjects in the control population who demand to be included in the test group because of perceived advantages. (By the way, this is a particularly striking matter in social experiments—for example, when parents discover that other children are in smaller classes, with more advantages in equipment, extra programs, additional teachers, and the like. These parents then press administrators to have their offspring moved to the advantaged setting or—if need be—sent to a different school. In any case, the randomization model underlying the experiment is damaged. Indeed, such a realization undercuts the control/comparison since the performance of the children is no longer a comparative counterfactual test.)

There are additional problems in medical research that are relevant for evaluating social experiments—even if randomized. The analysis of an experiment's results into subgroups is tricky; on the one hand, there is no *a priori* reason to assume that a given test condition will operate in a uniform manner for all subsets of the population. It is reasonable on that score to consider these differences. On the other hand, Nowak (1994) noted a disposition to break down the test subjects into progressively smaller subsets that eventually generate differences that are as much likely to reflect random outcomes across small populations as to reflect a meaningful result. Aside from the over-analysis of subgroups, Nowack also found questionable surrogate markers for clinical endpoints; indiscriminate inclusion in a five-year survival study of patients who had taken less than four-fifths of their medication and hence should have been dropped from the data used to establish the drug's effect (this becomes sticky because there is also an argument against dropping them as well as an argument against keeping them); an inability in some medical research to sort out side effects of a drug—in one case, for example, the drug was beneficial by reducing patient's high blood pressure but alas was also toxic, thereby nullifying its positive effect. This is interesting to us because in the social sciences it is relatively rare to see a consideration of "side effects"—to wit, research that considers not merely the targeted effect of a given program but also other effects of the same program. Appropriately, we would condemn medical research that did not examine side effects, but rarely do social researchers consider side effects for social policies. Another outcome in randomized medical research was a result that proved to be very

effective for treating colon cancer among young females in one trial but was specially effective for older males in a second trial one year later. This radically different conclusion about a drug's effectiveness appeared to reflect the small size of the trials coupled with a short-lived benefit. Again, we see the gold standard randomized experiment is not quite the cure-all for social research (see also Harrington [2000]).

It is all the more dangerous to assume that the statistical manipulation of observational data yields a reasonable estimation of what a true experiment might have yielded. As we have seen, a randomized experiment is *itself* a counterfactual statement about what would have happened to a population if a test condition had not been administered to it (say the administration of a drug, the development of a program for preschool education of children from impoverished homes, training programs, all sorts of government policies, and the like). The conversion of non-experimental data into an estimation of the outcome generated by a true experiment is, at best, a counterfactual estimate of what the results would have been under a true experiment. In point of fact, the observed data are likely not to be the same data as would have been obtained had the study been designed as an experiment. While naturally occurring experiments—events that have the crucial form of an experiment but were not induced by researchers—overcome some of these obstacles, relatively few of the questions of interest to social scientists are likely to align with such rare events. (Bear in mind that experiments can be plausible and highly desirable instruments for examining theories and hypotheses; also, counterfactual statistical estimating procedures have their potential place as well. Our goal is not to deny the promise of these procedures, but rather to note that we should not automatically defer to the evidence they generate. Actual experiments—let alone counterfactual experiments—are not going to provide a full solution to the data issue.) Granted, a well-executed randomized experiment provides the social researcher with a strong basis for causal inference; but even then, a second issue is the broad range of possible conditions that operate to affect the specific results from such an experiment. For example, in the case of the effect of a training program, the experiment can tell the researcher what the effect is of the *specific* training program on the *specific* subjects in a *specific* location. A wide variety of experiments would be needed to work out these conditions. And this becomes increasingly difficult when dealing with a counterfactual statistically adjusted design.

4.3. *Less Than Ideal Data*

In passing, Sections 4.1 and 4.2 have touched on some of the problems due to the nature and quality of social science data. It is often difficult for social researchers to obtain high quality measurements of the dependent variable, let alone causal factors. (Consider, for example, such matters as subjects dropping out of a study, answers that are incomplete, comparability over time and place, events that are not well-documented, and distortions by respondents.) These "obvious" considerations are apt to be skipped as the researcher prematurely focuses on the theoretical relevance of the results. However, it is relevant here because efforts to create an approximation of the results that would occur were the data of better quality should not ignore the need to create more appropriate standards that are suitable for evaluating the questions with the available data. Ignoring the latter is the social science equivalent of telling a story about an operation that is a success but the patient dies. In this case, the form of the analysis is wonderful but the data are not suitable for the problem.

4.4. *In Short*

Little is gained when theories are evaluated by combining unrealistic standards with less than ideal data, and employing methods that rest on unrealistic assumptions. Worse yet, this ritualism prevents us from recognizing the possibility of a more appropriate way of using data to evaluate theories. Our proposals are not a strict recipe or formula to be followed; there is no mechanical system that will escape judgment, sense, and intelligence. Indeed, one of the mistakes commonly made in contemporary social research is assuming the existence of standards or procedures that are applicable in a mechanical way to evaluate data (as, say, variance explained, predictive power, tests of significance, and the like). Social science methodology should not be viewed as developing a foolproof system in which data are plugged in at one end and the best answer is generated at the other. As is the case in all areas where evidence is gathered to evaluate a theory, success is often marked by imaginative and creative efforts. This is at least partly what might be called an "art." The general idea entails a search for relevant data (based on a far wider view of what is typically seen as *relevant*) coupled with appropriate

techniques and standards that can be used to squeeze every possible bit of use for the problem at hand.

5. IMPLICATION ANALYSIS: FISHER ON OBSERVATIONAL DATA

The inspiration for our proposal stems back to a conversation in the mid-1930s between the great British statistician R. F. Fisher and another distinguished statistician, W. G. Cochran. Two decades later, Cochran (1965) recalled the conversation:

> About 20 years ago, when asked in a meeting what can be done in observational studies to clarify the step from association to causation, Sir Ronald Fisher replied: "Make your theories elaborate." The reply puzzled me at first, since by Occam's razor the advice usually given is to make theories as simple as is consistent with known data. What Sir Ronald meant, as subsequent discussion showed, was that when constructing a causal hypothesis one should envisage as many *different* consequences of its truth as possible, and plan observational studies to discover whether each of these consequences is found to hold. (P. 252)

Cochran illustrated Fisher's advice with examples from the epidemiological triumph of that period—the extraordinary success in using observational data almost exclusively to determine the influence of cigarette smoking on health. Two types of studies are both prominent in his comments and of special interest to us. The first, alluded to above, expands on the theory under consideration. In the case of smoking, this means doing more than simply comparing the death rates of smokers and nonsmokers. It means comparing a wide variety of conditions: persons who smoked different amounts for comparable lengths of time; smokers who smoked the same amount but started at different ages; ex-smokers who had stopped recently and those who had stopped earlier; and so forth. Cochran (1965:252) concludes

Of course, the number and variety of consequences depends on the nature of the causal hypothesis, but imaginative thinking will sometimes reveal consequences that were not at first realized, and this multi-phasic attack is one of the most potent weapons in observational studies. In particular, the task of deciding between alternative hypotheses is made easier, since they may agree in predicting some consequences but will differ in others.

The other type of special interest is the generation of possible alternative conclusions that might explain the observed events *without reliance* on the theory under study (in this case, the smoking hypothesis). Note that this is a different step than the customary use of tests of significance to examine a broad null hypothesis—here it is to examine a specific alternative causal theory.

Cochran's comments and his examples from research on smoking are of more than historical interest: They are relevant to present practices. He is responding to situations where the data are largely observational and—even then—often of mixed quality, and where true experimentation is rare and the studies are often statistical estimations of true experiments. Cochran (1965) describes the challenge of drawing conclusions based on such data:

The combined evidence on a question that has to be decided mainly from observational studies will usually consist of a heterogeneous collection of results of varying quality, each bearing on some consequence of the causal hypothesis. If some results appear to support the hypothesis, some contradict it and some are neutral, reaching a verdict demands much skill. Obviously, the investigator should consider whether some revision of his hypothesis will remove the contradictions. In default of this, he cannot avoid an attempt to weigh the evidence for and against, since some results are so vulnerable to bias that they should be given low weight even if supported by routine tests of significance. (Pp. 253–54)

Regrettably, Cochran's observations about data are still highly relevant today. The present-day data situation in much of the social sciences is not much more superior to that confronted by Cochran decades ago. To be sure, the data sets and surveys are of better quality (and more numerous), and computers certainly allow for the manipulation of data and the use of elegant new statistical procedures, but researchers are still obliged to work with one form or another of observational data. Moreover, it is by no means certain that contemporary methods provide us with pathways to a high level of confidence for using the data to evaluate theories.

This brings us to the starting point of what we call *Implication Analysis*, which describes three basic steps in evaluating a causal hypothesis. First, the implications of a theory are developed for all sorts of conditions and circumstances (for example, different groups, different times and places, different social conditions) and these implications are then empirically examined. In all cases, studies will ask if the expectations based on the theory seem to "work."

The second step considers whether the evidence supports an alternative theory, again generating implications in a variety of contexts. Here we ask if there is evidence suggesting that the initial causal hypothesis is not causing the observed outcomes. In other words, is there an alternative that is even more successful in accounting for the observations covered by the initial theory and can extend to even broader ramifications? Or, at the very least, is there an alternate theory that covers important events that the initial theory cannot handle? There certainly will be instances when the conclusion is very clear after following these two steps. But moving away from an ideal image of how science should work and what data should be like, in reality more than likely we will confront somewhat mixed results with respect to the initial theory and also the alternative accounts.

If neither the initial hypothesis nor the alternative is fully satisfactory, a third step is needed to evaluate and compare the evidence supporting the initial theory and the alternative causal accounts. This step differs radically from the current disposition to either search for a third theory or at least somehow pool the two theories when confronting inconsistent results in which theories seem to work somewhat but not completely. Here our earlier observations about the quality of data evidence come into play. Rejection is a premature step unless one has gained sufficient confidence that it is not the evidence that is deficient

but rather the theory. This is a treacherous and challenging task: There is the danger that the theory will be erroneously rejected or accepted because of the poor quality of the empirical evidence. We will propose a set of checklists for evaluating such contradictory evidence.

6. EXTENDING A THEORY

In the social sciences, a useful theory should suggest a wide array of expansions. Some theories are narrow and read as if they are nothing more than a slightly modified restatement of the research finding. Other theories are broad and far-reaching. In either case, they should be approached in terms of gauging their range and potential value. (An extremely narrow and non-expansive hypothesis is likely to be replaced by a hypothesis that will incorporate these observations as well as have other applications.) Theories stated in broad and far-reaching terms need to be considered in all of their broad and far-reaching consequences in order to be appropriately evaluated. In any case, the initial examples presented of where either type of theory "works" or "fails" are nothing more than *examples*—even if they are attractive. As Rogowski (2004) notes, "inference proceeds most efficiently by three complementary routes: (1) making clear the essential model, or process, that one hypothesizes to be at work; (2) teasing out the deductive implications of that model, focusing particularly on the implications that seem *a priori* least plausible; and (3) rigorously testing those least plausible implications against empirical reality" (p. 76).

The typical research procedure starts with a set of observations that we would like to understand. We then apply a theory or hypothesis to see how well it handles these observations. Or the direction is reversed such that evidence is gathered in order to evaluate a theory. In either case, controls are also applied to increase our confidence that the apparent utility of the hypothesis is not due to other factors. If the hypothesis does seem to operate fairly well, we are done with the task. Another conventional reason for linking data occurs when we seek to determine if a theory is "true" or "false." We think of some data set that might be used as a "test" of the theory and then see if the theory meets the test (again applying a set of controls). As indicated earlier, it is inappropriate to assume that any one empirical study is sufficient to reach a true-false conclusion. Instead, following Fisher and Cochran, we propose

and illustrate more appropriate and demanding applications that do not rely on any single event, study, or data set, but rather explore the hypotheses generated by the theory and then, in turn, bombard these hypotheses with evidence. The goal is straightforward: We should search for as many extensions and consequences of the theory and then evaluate these consequences by obtaining or developing relevant data. We are not usually oriented to thinking this way.

A more demanding test occurs when a theory is examined under circumstances that differ from the context in which the theory was initially developed. Here, the theory is less likely to "pass," but "failure" does not necessarily mean that the theory is wrong for the original context or for contexts that are similar to it. In most social science situations, there are so many conditions operating to potentially affect the outcome that it almost takes a mutually shared suspension of disbelief to accept a conclusion without demanding not only replication but also wide-ranging studies that expand beyond the initial results. We speculate that one reason for the reluctance to examine the bounds of a theory is the mistaken notion that a "negative" result along the way will lead to the rejection of the theory—its *falsification,* as it were—if not by the investigator, then certainly by critics. Because a low threshold for rejecting a theory is so inappropriate in many areas of social science, we develop below some important steps for evaluating inconsistent evidence without simply tossing out the theory. The paradox of such an expansion is that it will almost certainly lead to "negative evidence" where the implications of the theory fail to hold, but a useful theory will in fact have ramifications that move beyond the very literal question under review.

6.1. *Bourdieu Meets Data*

Sometimes the extension of a theory is simple yet very effective. By examining Bourdieu's (1984) theory of the role of cultural capital in contexts differing from the one in which it was developed, the limitations and boundaries of this theory are explored. Erickson (1996), for example, used a work setting to examine the ramifications of Bourdieu's theory in establishing and maintaining hierarchies. Her results are strikingly different from what would be deduced from a simplistic reading of Bourdieu. To be sure, cultural capital played a conversational role in her analysis, but it was hardly the type of capital discussed by Bourdieu.

Likewise, Halle's study (1993) of class factors on the display of art in New York homes, as well as class differences in attitudes toward different types of paintings, is relevant to our discussion here. On the one hand, the class differences in attitude and display were in keeping with deductions we might make from Bourdieu, but a striking deviation is found. Halle found that the art displayed by the higher SES subjects does not reflect their cultural capital or their ability to understand the work but rather their notions of what would be appropriate and attractive art in their home. Finally, Lamont (1992) examined the role of cultural capital among respondents of a comparable class in the United States and France, finding radical differences between the two. The lesson is clear: Bourdieu's theory is a "big" theory, with wide-ranging applications and consequences. It is unlikely to always fail, but it is also unlikely to always hold. Therefore, the examination of the value and utility of the theory can be helped by drawing consequences from the theory and applying them to a wide variety of contexts. It is not helpful for a study to conclude that his thesis is "false" or "wrong" because it fails to hold in a specific empirical context. Nor are we helped by a study claiming to prove that Bourdieu's theory is correct in some absolute sense because the results agree with his theory. In effect, bounds need to be drawn around the theory that reflect the preponderance of evidence on different facets of it. On this score, we admire Erickson for avoiding the temptation to conclude that Bourdieu's theory is wrong—obviously, her study should generate a wide number of different studies of cultural capital used in the workplace before such a conclusion would be appropriate. More likely, it will lead to an analysis of the work contexts in which high cultural capital may be enhancing, neutral, or actually counterproductive for those who display it. Put another way, exploring the role cultural capital plays in various contemporary Western settings—to say nothing of non-Western settings—or earlier periods would almost certainly further help to mold and expand Bourdieu's theory. Obviously, no single scholarly group can do all of this; and that is why it is appropriate to think of human knowledge as a communal effort, particularly when there is either a theory or empirical result that has the possibility of deeply impacting a potentially important problem (we will return to this later). Many extensions are not implied by the initial theory. For example, there is nothing in Bourdieu that would lead us to view him as describing the United States. But it is still useful to search for the boundaries of the theory.

6.2. *A Theory About China Examined with Russian Data*

Nee and his associates theorized that the transition from state socialism to a market economy would increase returns to human capital and entrepreneurial initiative and decrease returns to political position (Nee 1989, 1991, 1996; Nee and Matthews 1996). Gerber and Hout (1998) sought to expand the applicability of market transition theory by applying it to another important case, Russia. Their procedure illustrates the potential of the general methodological model we have in mind. Based on their reading of Nee's work, Gerber and Hout generated six general hypotheses and 16 specific empirical hypotheses to be tested with five years of survey data. For example, from the general hypothesis "Market transition increases returns to education," three specific expectations were developed:

1. The total effect of education on earnings in Russia increases from 1991 to 1995.
2. At any given time, the returns to education in the private sector of the economy exceed the returns to education in the state sector.
3. The returns to education in the private sector in 1995 exceed the returns to education in the private sector in 1991 (Gerber and Hout 1998:7–8).

After examining the 16 hypotheses, Gerber and Hout concluded that the predictions of market transition theory were contradicted by the Russian data. They argued that the case of China, which Nee used to develop his market transition theory, could not be applied generically to other countries. The key differences between China and Russia, they stated, were the pace at which market transition had taken place as well as the political origins of each country's transition. Russia began market reform after the collapse of the Soviet political system, which resulted in "steep contraction, rather than economic growth," whereas China's transition had been gradual and simultaneous with "enforced political stability" by the Chinese government (Gerber and Hout 1998:36). Therefore, they suggested, the social stratification implications of the move from socialism to capitalism were more dependent on country context than had been suggested by Nee's theory. Nee later argued that a certain number of Gerber and Hout's hypotheses, particularly those dealing with predictions of decline in the gender gap and differences in

benefits to actors in the private sector versus state sector, were "not truly *derived* from market transition theory" (Cao and Nee 2000:1186). He in fact argued that Gerber and Hout had treated "economic depression, high levels of unemployment, and hyperinflation as processes intrinsic to market transition," but, in his estimation, the presence of these processes might indicate that Russia had not established a market economy at all during the years of the Gerber and Hout study (Cao and Nee 2000:1186–87). However, the ensuing development of the field suggests that Gerber and Hout's work was part of a body of research that led to a more nuanced perspective on market transitions (see Szelenyi and Kostello [1996]; Nee and Cao [1999]; and Cao and Nee [2000]). Without taking a substantive position, we would argue that Gerber and Hout's approach—generating numerous implications from a theory and examining them systematically—contributed to a debate over market transition theory. As Zhou (2000:1190) argued, empirical data suggesting a possible contradiction with market transition theory provide an opportunity for theoretical growth. This approach to evaluating theories through close examination of their implications encourages ongoing refinement of understanding of sociological phenomena. In this particular case, the arguments back and forth, with the addition of new participants (i.e., third parties), are an ideal way of evaluating and specifying the suitability of the implications developed and the quality of the data.

6.3. *Expanding the Settings*

The great wave of European immigration to the United States, culminating in the immigration restrictions enacted in the 1920s, was marked by an important difference in the arrival timing of different groups. Up through about 1880, European immigrants were primarily from Northwestern Europe (the "Old Groups"); after 1880, migrants from South, Central, and Eastern Europe were the major sources (the "New Groups"). There was considerable public and scholarly debate on the relative success of these two groups, with the latter's poorer standing often attributed to biological factors and character flaws. Forgetting the questionable explanations, was this even a valid analysis of their different levels of accomplishments? Length of stay in the United States, along with the existence of earlier members of the group in the country, made it difficult to compare those members of the Old Groups coming

after 1880 with New Groups who were migrating at the same period.[4] Although there are numerous ways of dealing with this, there is a problem in the sense that the timing of the waves are different and therefore it is hard to sort the generational effect from the historical set of conditions—a problem that continues to occur in the United States for relatively new immigrant flows.

Australian immigration policy after World War II provided what we would now call a "natural experiment" that can be used to address the key features of the comparative issues in the United States. Prior to the end of World War II, Australia was open to immigration from the British Isles but largely closed to immigration from anywhere else in Europe. After World War II, they opened up to immigration from everywhere in Europe—indeed, they encouraged it. Consequently, immigrants from Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, and 16 other "New Groups" were first reaching Australia in sizable numbers at the same time that northwestern Europeans from nine nations (including Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) were arriving. According to Australian data (Lieberson 1963), these groups were compared over a wide range of measures: six work force characteristics; three spatial distribution measures, including one that covered residential segregation in four metropolitan areas; intermarriage, naturalization, and birth rates; and three measures of social problems. The conclusion was straightforward: There was no evidence to support the broad theory of Old Group superiority developed for immigrants around 1900 in the United States. Is the United States the same as Australia? Are the groups coming after World War II identical to the same groups arriving in the United States in sizable numbers at least 50 years, and in some cases centuries, before? Obviously no. However, at the very least, the results are harmonious with an alternative interpretation of events in the United States. In this case, there are grounds for reconsidering the initial theory about Old-New differences, but the conclusion drawn from Australia is by no means any more definitive than the conclusion drawn in the United States.

All three of these examples, although taking different forms, are based on a common assumption—namely, a theory cannot be

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[4] This is a brief summary of a complex and important issue at the time. E. A. Ross, a major sociologist in his time, and a president of what was then called the American Sociological Society, wrote a book in 1914 expressing concern with the racial and cultural deterioration of the United States; for some choice quotes, see Lieberson (1980:25–26).

adequately evaluated using a single data set. Whether the initial data set supports or fails to support the causal theory, it is almost certain to be insufficient evidence. Rarely will there be a single study that is hardy and extensive enough to nail down the utility of a theory (except perhaps for what we might call *pseudo-theories*—namely, when a finding is restated in the form of a narrow and highly restricted causal proposition). Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the impact of a theory—even if framed as a "universal theory"—will be obvious in all times and places. This is because the influence of other conditions may modify and outweigh the impact of the so-called universal theory. In addition, there is no reason to assume that it is possible to successfully "control" all of these other influences.

By considering the implications of a theory in broader terms and asking if the relevant evidence supports this theory, we are evaluating the theory as well as considering the bounds under which the theory holds. This is essentially the procedure endorsed by Schliesser (2005) in his review of the underpinnings of experimental economist George Smith (1994, 2002). Theory is not viewed simply a source for predictions—rather it is viewed as an engine for discovery (Schliesser 2005:51). The goal is not confirmation or refutation—as we might think of it in the falsification issue—but rather it is the generation of information to improve and modify the theory. If we do not expect that all possible ramifications of the theory must hold, the interaction between evidence and the causal implications of a theory will be less timid and bolder in considering more realistic patterns.

As we shall see, a negative result does not mean that the theory is inherently flawed. On the other hand, a result that is consistent with the theory is *promising*, but its utility is hardly established. This elaboration means generating as many consequences of the theory, and from as many sources, as possible and evaluating the body of evidence. It also means that it may sometimes be necessary to use less-than-ideal data (of course, that is the case now), recognizing that some of the contradictory results may simply reflect the quality of the data rather than an inadequacy of the theory. In evaluating the theory, we should expect efforts to think through the measurement of the dependent variable, and especially important is a willingness—where necessary—to examine the consequences of the theory with the outcomes observed in some situations, regardless of how tightly the causal mechanisms have been measured. Ultimately, this model is a communal model—it depends on

the efforts of a community of researchers pursuing different facets of the same problem. We remind the reader that this is precisely the guidance from Fisher reported by Cochran in the quotation cited in Section 5 of this paper. Ultimately, the outcome will depend on the ability to weigh and evaluate the body of evidence to reach a conclusion about the theory. But such an evaluation encompasses the work of many.

7. EXAMINING ALTERNATIVE THEORIES AND EXPLANATIONS

If an initial theory yields reasonably promising results, then the next step in Implication Analysis is to list and evaluate alternative explanations "including all different hypotheses and biases in the results" (Cochran 1965:252–53). By bombarding the initial theory with alternatives, researchers ask if there is an alternative that can not only account for the same observations as the first one, but does it also explain additional observations? Or, even if an alternative theory fails to account for some observations covered by the first, does it cover events for which the initial theory cannot? Although we would like to deal with an alternative of at least comparable scope, also relevant are narrower causal propositions—not as broad in magnitude and range as the initial one— if they reveal a serious weakness in the initial theory. Finally, there is always the challenging question of whether the initial causal connection is illusory, reflecting a spurious presence between the initially hypothesized cause and the "true" causal force (for example, see the discussion of arsenic and lung cancer below).

At first glance, this second phase may appear to be nothing more than intellectual masochism. Since it is hard enough to find a theory that will hold up for a broad range of events, why go out of the way to consider if a "successful" theory can be superseded or at least needs modification? Given our earlier review of the obstacles that the social sciences usually face, we cannot be satisfied with a result that is simply harmonious with the causal theory. Rather, it is necessary to ascertain if other theories and possible biases can also account for these results. Until then, the initial results should be described only as *promising*.

It is unlikely that the available evidence—if subjected to a rigorous examination—will fully support the initial theory on all counts.

This is not a crucial problem if we take a probabilistic rather than a simple dichotomous view of a theory that the evidence says is *true* or *false*. Given the nature of the data as well as the difficulty in coping with a complex environment all at once, not all of the results are likely to work out as expected—even if the theory is extraordinarily robust. Of value, on this score, is Popper's distinction between what he calls the "pre-scientific" and "scientific" levels of evaluating the soundness of a theory. The scientific standard, Popper explains, "presupposes that we can look at our theories critically—as something outside ourselves. They are not any longer our subjective beliefs—they are our objective conjectures" (Magee 1971:73). This can be seen as Popper's way of distinguishing between conclusions that are reached after an extensive and rigorous consideration of the theory and the evidence, as opposed to conclusions that are reached when the investigator finds *some* evidence in support of a theoretical claim and then chooses to use these results to mount an argument in its favor—even when the evidence is far from being as extensive or as conclusive as can be generated in the social sciences. (This is far more beneficial, in our judgment, than his misunderstood "falsification" idea.) It is simply *necessary* to address alternatives as a way of ultimately reaching some consensus about the superiority of one or another theory, or quite possibly consider whether a need exists for modification or development of a new alternative. Some examples are presented below of the process through which an established theory is challenged by alternative causal propositions.

7.1. *Lung Cancer*

At first glance, this example dealing with lung cancer and the following one on cholera may appear inappropriate for a discussion dealing with social research. They are included for a special reason. In both cases, the initial research and conclusions were based on the same type of data that we typically encounter in social science: no experimentation and initially somewhat vague theories accompanied by the need to weigh alternative theories and speculations. Both efforts are later supported by the kind of evidence all too rarely seen in sociology. In that sense, we can see a powerful validation of the types of procedures that can be followed in the social sciences in the absence of experimentation and accompanied by potentially damaging questions of selectivity. (Fisher himself asserted

that people who smoked were more likely to get lung cancer because they were *initially different* from nonsmokers—as opposed to getting lung cancer as a *consequence of smoking*.)

The review by Doll and Hill (1952) of the reported association between smoking and lung cancer is cited by Cochran (1965) as an elegant example of the reasoning and evidence used by imaginative researchers to evaluate alternatives to the theory attributing the smoking of cigarettes as a major cause of lung cancer. Admirable as their groundbreaking work may have been at its time, Doll and Hill's procedures are relevant for present-day social science. In fact, their reasoning is highly applicable to some of the major problems addressed today. As the biological mechanism linking the ingredients in tobacco with lung cancer was not yet known and there was no experimental evidence to consider, their review was based largely on observational data of the sort that the social scientist is still often obliged to use. (Keep in mind that this paper addresses not the continuous advances in statistics but rather ways of thinking about the evidence—whether it is statistical, experimental, or qualitative.)

Arsenic provided a challenging causal alternative to the hypothesis that tobacco is the causal ingredient responsible for the higher frequency of lung cancer among cigarette smokers. Since arsenic was a widely used ingredient in the insecticides sprayed on tobacco plants, it was plausible that arsenic—rather than the tobacco—was the source of the lung cancer frequently occurring among smokers. (At that time, the agent[s] in tobacco smoke responsible for cancer had not been located.) This is not a trivial alternative since a radically different public health solution would be to eliminate the arsenic in insecticides rather than discouraging smoking *per se*. Finding that arsenic was not used for growing tobacco in Turkey, Doll and Hill (1952) explored the cancer rates in that nation. They found that the frequency of lung cancer in Turkey was in line with the level of smoking in that country, when compared with rates for other nations where tobacco plants were exposed to arsenic—hardly supporting this alternative interpretation. Note how the determination of the mechanism is also crucial for evaluating causal relations in social research—particularly when the investigations are intended for policy applications.

A variety of alternative explanations were evaluated by Doll and Hill through the use of appropriate evidence. For example, they even considered the use of petrol lighters by smokers as the causal factor—not

the smoking *per se*—and found evidence to reject this. Since only smokers would be using cigarette lighters, how did they reach this conclusion? They compared the lung cancer rate of smokers who used lighters with smokers who used matches thereby providing an estimate of the influence of lighters *per se* on lung cancer rates. Since lung cancer had been reported as especially common among gasworkers, they considered that factor and found it wanting. They also found the "use of coal, gas, or electric fires or other forms of heating in the living-rooms of their homes did not differ appreciably" between patients with lung cancer in comparison with patients suffering from other diseases (p. 1284). They evaluated possible problems in the quality of the data. For instance, they considered whether the information on smoking behavior collected from patients with lung cancer was warped such that "the lung-carcinoma patients tended, because of their disease, to exaggerate their smoking habits" or "that the interviewers tended to scale up the smoking habits of the lung-carcinoma patients" (p. 1282). But the possibility of an interviewer effect was also ruled out. They determined that the smoking rates compiled by interviewers for patients initially diagnosed as having lung cancer (but later found to have a different disease) were comparable to other non–lung cancer patients and much lower than those compiled for lung cancer patients. Considerable attention was also paid to the possibility that social class played a role in lung cancer for a variety of reasons such as occupational differences in the exposure to carcinogenic risks. They found that class *per se* was not a factor at all.

Doll and Hill (1952) also effectively eliminated various hereditary possibilities by considering the shifts over time in smoking and the corresponding shifts in lung cancer (hardly likely to reflect a sudden genetic shift) and the lag in lung cancer for women, when compared to men, was found to be closely linked to the lag in smoking. Finally, they were able to evaluate and provisionally reject the alternative theory that people with a certain constitution were more likely to smoke and therefore more likely to develop lung cancer—in other words, that the association between smoking and lung cancer was spurious, not causal. The grounds for rejecting this proposition are of interest because they illustrate that the reasoning behind certain theories can be evaluated by considering some basic data along with the implication of the theory. In this case, if lung cancer is indeed not caused by smoking but by a physical condition that leads those prone to develop lung cancer to also

smoke, then Doll and Hill show that it would take some very strong alternative environmental factor to account for the enormous growth in lung cancer at the same time that there is a concomitant growth in smoking. Put another way, lung cancer was relatively rare prior to the growth in cigarette smoking, but the physical condition leading to the development of lung cancer outside of smoking presumably would have been present prior to smoking's popularity.

Many of these observational steps are of special interest because inferences are not based on direct evidence. When we consider the growing disposition to attribute social outcomes to genetic causes, the work of Doll and Hill (1952) is an even more important model. But we should not lose sight of the main goal—addressing and evaluating alternative causal explanations. That is really the case for attributing the occurrence of lung cancer to biological sources such as the propensity of those disposed to lung cancer to also be the ones who smoke—a reversal of the causal direction in the initial theory under consideration. Instead, the alternative hypothesis is evaluated by considering its implications and then ascertaining whether the expected indirect evidence is consistent with the alternative theory.

In the absence of suitable direct evidence, note that imaginative steps can be taken to evaluate a theory in terms of its observable consequences. For example, sociobiologists attribute various facets of social behavior to genetic sources. It is very difficult—at least at this point—to directly evaluate such claims. But it is another matter to evaluate the implication of the theory. If the attraction between the sexes were genetically driven in terms of survival of the species, this would imply relative constancy of the feature's appeal over time as well as a direct correlation between the physical feature and its benefit for survival and reproduction (allowing for historical contexts). The failure of these implications to hold would obviously not be a definitive negation of the theory, but it would require even stronger evidence in support of the sociobiological theory—at least with respect to attractiveness between the sexes.

7.2. *Cholera*

The causal analysis of cholera by pioneering epidemiologist John Snow provides another superb example of how an established theory and an alternative can be evaluated by weighing the empirical implications of

one against the other. Note that this is not in the simplistic form of using some specific case of a predicted outcome as "a crucial test" of the two theories. Here, observations of the differences in the causal processes and mechanisms implied by the two theories are used to evaluate the competing theories. Our entire discussion is drawn from Freedman's excellent review of John Snow's work on cholera (1993). The dominant theory in the 1850s was that disease was caused by minute, inanimate poisonous particles in the air, called "miasmas." Freedman reminds us that the microscopes of that time were of such low quality that human pathogens could not be seen and the infection theory had a limited number of supporters.

Snow observed that cholera had a history of striking in waves, with early symptoms being vomiting and diarrhea. This led him to speculate that there was a living organism that entered the body with food or drink, multiplied in the body, and then passed out and got into the water supply, thereby infecting new victims. Snow's task consisted not only of developing his theory to account for cholera but also evaluating the dominant alternative explanation in terms of how well it could account for the epidemiological features of cholera. He noticed that cholera has a specific pattern of spreading. It tracks human commerce. "If a ship goes from a cholera-free country to a cholera-stricken port, the sailors get the disease only after they land or take on supplies. The disease strikes hardest at the poor, who live in the most crowded housing with the worst hygiene. These facts are consistent with the infection theory and hard to explain with the miasma theory" (Freedman 1993:295).

Snow used all sorts of observational data in a continuous interaction between the evidence and his theory. He found that the first case of a new epidemic was attributed to a seaman, newly arrived in London from Hamburg—where the disease was prevalent. He found the second case was a man who had taken a room in the place where the first carrier was living. He observed that the residents in one of two adjacent apartment buildings were badly hit by cholera, but not the residents in the neighboring building. In turn, he found that the water supply for the first building was contaminated by runoff from privies whereas the water in the second building was substantially cleaner.

The cholera epidemic occurred during a period in which there were various private companies supplying water in the same areas of the city. Some took their water from polluted sources, such as the

Thames, while other companies used cleaner sources. A natural experiment, therefore, was possible because the water companies served many of the same neighborhoods—indeed some were serving houses on the same block. Given that the consumption of clean versus polluted water in a block was not a function of other characteristics of the residents, the linkage between the water source and the incidence of cholera could be attributed to the water supply itself. This, in turn identified a causal connection between the cleanliness of the water supply and cholera. Freedman (1993:295) goes on to show how Snow's spot maps during the 1853–1854 epidemic in London provided strong support for the causal connection between the quality of the water supply and cholera, with the incidence of cholera piling up around the pumps supplying contaminated water.

There are other examples of how Snow evaluates the implications of his theory, which miasma theory cannot explain. For example, in a location where there was a high incidence of cholera around the pump supplied by contaminated water, he found a poorhouse with very few cases. He discovered that the poorhouse had its own well and the inmates did not take water from the contaminated pump. He also found a brewery with no cases of cholera; it was one where the workers drank beer, not water. Bear in mind the crucial ecological correlation between the levels of cholera among residents connected to a water company drawing water above the main sewage discharge points in the Thames, as contrasted with comparable residents using water from companies that used intake points downstream from the sewage discharge points. A table constructed by Snow, based on the experiences of 300,000 people, shows a remarkably higher level of deaths among those residing in houses drawing their water from polluted sources. (See Freeman's discussion beginning on p. 296, which includes on p. 298 a summary of Snow's table.)

Other events supported his conclusions. New York City unsuccessfully treated the cholera epidemics in 1832 and 1849 with such methods as calling for temperance from the residents; bringing in pure water to *wash the streets*; and treating the sick by bleeding and mercury. When the implications of Snow's theory were followed in the 1886 epidemic (boiling the drinking water, isolating the sick, and disinfecting their bodily wastes), the death rate was less than one-tenth of the earlier rates. (Freedman also traces the later biological evidence that fully supported Snow's theory.)

7.3. *Durkheim's Analysis of Suicide*

Because the pioneering study of suicide by Emile Durkheim (1951) is well known, we will only note that much of the rich empirical work in that volume can be seen as harmonious with the suggestions going back to Cochran's approach inspired by Fisher, and that it is also consistent with the response to inconsistent evidence that we will discuss next. Namely, the various theories of suicide that others had advanced are bounced against the evidence that Durkheim gathers to evaluate them. This is in turn followed by alternate theories of suicide proposed by Durkheim, who then weighs them with the available evidence. Whether the reader wishes to consider this as an exemplar of social science research is not the issue (witness the heavy reliance on what we now call "ecological correlations"). Rather it is an extraordinarily early example of the dialogue between data and competing theories; the evaluation of various theories is almost entirely based on observational data that are less than ideal. He addresses each theory—whether it is one that he eventually supports or rejects—with all sorts of data meant to get at the implications of the theory as best as is possible. More about this later, when we deal with an almost inevitable outcome of this research proposal—to wit, the results will not be entirely consistent.

8. EVALUATING INCONSISTENT EVIDENCE: JURY TRIALS AND CHECKLISTS

For good reason, multiple empirical evaluations of a theory are apt to generate inconsistent findings that are difficult to interpret. Is there a problem with the theory? Or does the inconsistency reflect the data used to evaluate the theory? Or is there a more complicated situation such that the theory is valid but other conditions need to be considered? Sound theories might very well stumble because of data problems. By the same token, inadequate or inappropriate evidence may appear to support unsound theories. Of course, we cannot ignore largely consistent results in one direction but even then we have to proceed with caution. Consistent empirical support of a theory is a good sign but is not necessarily definitive. Likewise, an occasional contradictory result need not mean that the theory is invalid or in need of modification. One way or another,

it is necessary to consider if inconsistent results are reflecting a problem with the data or a weakness in the theory.

8.1. *Resolving Inconsistent Evidence*

Since the analysis of inconsistent and incomplete evidence is itself underdeveloped, our observations in this section apply to various research "strategies." Inconsistent evidence can rarely be resolved with the procedures typically employed by social science. Theory testing, tests of significance, principles of parsimony, estimates of predictive power, variance explained, usage of control variables, simulation of true experiments, and other routine procedures are unlikely to accomplish this task. This is because the contradictions must consider the quality and relevance of the evidence. As such, our discussion should be viewed as what we hope will prove to be a starting point for a more extensive way to approach results that appear to largely, but not fully, support one theory. This occurs in two interesting forms: (1) when not all of the results can be explained by the most promising theory, but no other theory can successfully encompass the remaining results; and (2) when neither of the theories can account for essentially all of the results, but together they provide a fairly complete accounting. (There are other more complex difficulties that should be addressed, but this is enough for a starter.)

   In short, our usual ways of dealing with inconsistent or contradictory results are predicated on closing our eyes to the situation that the social researcher typically encounters. The disposition is understandable: go forward with what one has. A case is made for this since—hopefully—something is better than nothing and being hypercritical without decent alternatives is nonproductive when we find results that the researcher would like to support. Why look further? In particular, why run the "risk" of finding a different result? In no small way, the shortcomings we encounter can be overcome with the alternatives described below.

8.2. *A Jury Trial*

The jury trial is an appropriate and useful analogy for the social sciences. Just as all of the evidence in the trial may not consistently point in

the same direction, likewise we can expect that not all of the research evidence will point in the same direction when a theory is evaluated. To illustrate, let's imagine ourselves as members of a jury. The defendant has been charged with breaking into a bank and stealing a stash of hundred-dollar bills. (Think of this as a causal theory.) In support of this charge, the prosecutor presents evidence. The prosecutor calls on eyewitnesses, fingerprint experts, the police who found the money in the defendant's car trunk, and the like. The defense in turn presents evidence to show us that the defendant did not break into the bank and that there is instead an alternative explanation of the prosecution's evidence (in other words, that the causal hypothesis is not correct). The defense provides testimony showing that the defendant was elsewhere at the time of the crime; a demonstration that the lighting and distance between the accused and a witness would make definitive identification impossible; and an alternative explanation for the fingerprints and the banknotes in the car (revealing that the defendant found the money on the street and was actually en route to a police station when stopped). Of course, this analogy is a bit of a stretch since hopefully all researchers are seeking the truth without resorting to rhetoric and other devices meant to hide all the relevant facts. (In a criminal case, the defendant does not want a lawyer who shows that there are six reasons to think the client is innocent, albeit pointing out three reasons in the opposite direction.)

Note that the failure of one part of the prosecution's case or the defense's case does not solve the issue. If the defense shows that the distance and lighting conditions reduce confidence in the eyewitness identification of the defendant, this is not necessarily a crucial test—after all, there is other evidence to support their case than just this. Even a persistent negative result in a complex case will not necessarily mean the theory is "wrong," and instead it shows only that the theory is not supported by one particular facet of the evidence.

A crucial factor is not the result *per se*, but what the result contributes to our evaluation of the theory. Evidence for or against a theory is good, but there are two other questions that have to be addressed. One is what we can call a *technical question*—namely, given the preponderance of evidence pointing in one direction, can we account for the minority of results in the opposite direction? Note that a probabilistic perspective does not require such an accounting. But as we move from situations of overwhelming evidence in one direction to a more difficult

result where the predominant outcome clashes with a modest number of contrary results, then we will be happier if we can resolve this. The second question to consider is whether the result is a crucial one. In the jury trial, for example, the evidence introduced by the defense about lighting and distance has undercut our confidence in the eyewitness identification of the defendant. Does this matter? There is no simple answer because the answer depends on whether the identification was crucial. Is there a sufficient body to convict—i.e., to support the theory? Or does this wipe out the heart of the case?

8.3. *Technical Issues: A Basic Checklist*

Data quality is a dynamic issue; inevitably, what is considered suitable data will change over time as knowledge about a topic proceeds. The first step in evaluating contradictory or inconsistent results is a pro-saic one. Rather than considering new theories or modifying a theory to exclude the deviant cases (for example, see the use of scope statements proposed by Walker and Cohen [1985]), or looking for neglected control variables that might explain the difficulties, we must ask about the quality and nature of the data. In essence, we need a checklist of possible difficulties due to a variety of differences in the procedures, measurements, context, sampling, and the like that could account for inconsistent or contradictory results. How good are the data? How well do the data measure what we want to know? We know the usual answer: *not as good as we would like, but the best we can work with—given the limits of money, time, place, or practicality*. Fair enough, but this does not mean that the issue should be ignored, particularly when evaluating conflicting results. For instance, if some of the results go one way and some go another, are the results associated with the different types of data or with some other procedure?

This checklist requires serious consideration about such matters as the form of the question used in a survey; the sample; the coding of the data; possible biases of the organizations conducting the survey; distortions due to the interviewers or researchers; and "adjustments of the data." We have even witnessed dichotomous data that were coded incorrectly, so that what appeared to be an association in one direction was in fact occurring in the opposite direction. No type of data is immune from these matters: Just as studies provided by commercial or policy

organizations are susceptible to errors, so too are official governmental data. Likewise, surveys and ethnographic studies each have their problems. Only recently, for example, has there been a greater focus on the need to monitor and minimize the danger of unintentional distortions causing inconsistencies on respondents' answers (see Yin [2003]). And it is appropriate to ask this question of other data as well—for example, inconsistent results between "hard" and "soft" data.

Incomplete responses are another difficult problem that can generate inconsistent results. Some surveyors go to great lengths to increase the response rate or to estimate the distortions resulting from incomplete responses. There has been some progress since Wiley (1984) illuminated the distortions in conclusions that can result from nonresponse in surveys—whether they are respondents who initially refuse to answer a survey or who are lost in the second wave of a survey. Recently, we have found sound evidence that nonresponse need not always mean selectivity leading to a serious distortion, but certainly it does operate as a major consideration in evaluating the results. (Singer [2006] includes a diverse set of results about the connection between nonresponse rates and nonresponse bias.) In any case, we must consider nonresponse bias as a possible source for inconsistent results.

The statistical techniques applied to data analysis are probably the most common issue considered in discussions about results generally, let alone the difference in results. It is a specialized matter that merits—and receives—extensive discussion. In passing, we note its relevance for the checklist of technical issues. The assumptions underlying many statistical procedures are often neglected or ignored, with dire consequences for the conclusions obtained. In addition to the question of what is the *best* method, there is also the question of whether the choice of method accounts for the inconsistency or consistency in the outcomes observed.

There is another deep issue that is so obvious and pervasive and seemingly intractable that it tends to be ignored. Do the data measure what we want to measure? More subtly, we want to know how closely the actual data approximates the ideal data. This is tricky to contemplate. We know, of course, that rarely do we have ideal data, and that it can be a pointless exercise to deal with a task that cannot be fully mastered or even measured very well. On the other hand, the gap between the *actual* and the *ideal* can easily affect consistency in the results and interpretation of the empirical outcome—whether it be largely consistent

with the theory, largely inconsistent, or somewhere in between. This is a particularly important matter when working with observational data not initially gathered or developed by the investigator, but it is of equal importance when the researcher has gathered the data—whether it is observational or even experimental. There is a strong chance that data developed by some other researcher or organization are not exactly the measure that the researcher would have wanted to use. Not all discrepancies are equal, as it were, and therefore some studies of the same topic may be closer to the ideal than others (the *ideal* being what would have been chosen from a universe of all possible data sets).

Even with experiments based on random assignments, the researcher may end up with data that are not exactly the *ideal*—in the context described above. After all, there are limits on what researchers can do to people, or even ask them, let alone limits on the availability of the information for organizations, nations, and the like. There can be improvements on surrogate measures, but surrogate measures are still surrogate measures. Therefore, it is always necessary to consider the appropriateness of the data. First, if the results are inconsistent, does this merely reflect the differences in the nature of the data and its quality? Second, regardless of consistency issues, do the data provide a reasonable approximation of what would be the ideal measure? This is a serious problem in counterfactual analyses since extensive statistical manipulation will be required and the measurements are more likely to deviate from the ideal. Since the typical counterfactual analysis uses data that differ from the ideal, this means that the results are counterfactual statements about counterfactual estimates.

We can think of theories as varying along a continuum from a narrow range to a broad range of empirical ramifications. This generates another technical problem. As a general rule, the obstacles to evaluating a theory properly vary directly with its breadth. A theory with a narrow range of applications is relatively easier to evaluate because the ramifications of the theory entail less variation in the contexts that need to be considered. For a valid theory of this type, inconsistent results are less probable (assuming confidence in the data) and contradictory results are more likely to signal rejection or the need to modify the theory. The downside is that the theory has less range.

In contrast, a theory that covers a wide range of situations will require far broader empirical examination and, as such, will encounter increasingly heterogeneous situations involving different

context variables, measurement problems, and the like. We can expect more a priori situations where the theory will fail to hold—not because it is "wrong" but simply because there will be the need to take into account other circumstances that could overpower the expectations generated by the theory. Of course, the greater diversity of situations means more and more opportunities for errors and problems in the basic measurement issues. This leads us to a straightforward proposition: The standards for evaluating a theory should take into account the nature of the theory. As a wider variety of contexts are encountered, there is a greater chance that the implications of the theory under consideration will be masked by the influences due to other factors that get in the way. As the range of a theory increases, the likelihood of finding inconsistent evidence will increase—even if it is valid—because the array of variables to be included will also increase. As the variety of attributes (considered in at least one setting) increases, there is more exposure to measurement error. The importance of reviewing the various technical issues is all the more vital.[5]

9. CONCLUSIONS

The quality of evidence in the social sciences rarely allows for the evaluation of a theory in a manner comparable to what we believe occurs in the hard sciences. Nothing is gained by acting as if the conventional data and standards in the social sciences permit strong conclusions. Fortunately, more can be done than simply wringing our hands and bemoaning the absence of "science-like" substitutes. There is no point in retracing all of the steps described in this paper, but we remind the reader of several key points.

First, there is a distinction between finding a specific result that is consistent with a theory as opposed to a body of results (incorporating different contexts and different alternatives) that supports the theory.

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[5] Although Walker and Cohen (1985) have also noted the increasing likelihood that evidence for broad theories may often be contradictory, we quickly part company in the analysis of both the cause and in their solution. They take a deterministic view of theories such that an exception or an inconsistency is deeply damaging to a theory, requiring development of scope statements in order to modify the theory and thereby "save" it. Quality of evidence is not an issue for them. The "failure" of a theory is never attributed to the series of obstacles we describe.

Consider an example drawn from Aczel (1997:103). Suppose I observe seven men and seven women in a room. I conjecture that these are seven married couples. My companion responds that while there is no obvious reason for rejecting the statement as false there is no reason for accepting the statement as true either. The presence of seven men and seven women in the room hardly rules out a variety of other possibilities. Just to name a few: all of the people could be single; some could be married, others not; they could all be part of a large family (brothers, sisters, offspring, aunts, uncles, cousins); they could be coworkers. Obviously, more empirical work is needed before we could be satisfied with the correctness of the conclusion. The fact that the married-couple hypothesis is consistent with the limited evidence does not mean that it is true. The accumulation of data in favor of this hypothesis and inconsistent with rival hypotheses is necessary in order to increase our confidence. In a more general way, we can say that the result for the "seven married couples" is a *dangling theory*. It may or may not be true, but the evidence is insufficient. We must also recognize that the inadequacy of the data tells us nothing about the adequacy of the theory. It means only that we do not know enough with the available evidence. Unless it is truly impossible to obtain the necessary evidence now (or in the future), inadequate data are not grounds for either rejecting or accepting a dangling theory. To do so is to commit a very common mistake in the social sciences: concluding that the absence of information means that the theory (or conclusion) under consideration is false.

Second, a large number of observations and the consideration of both a variety of contexts and alternative theories are required to evaluate a theory. This is particularly the case for an important and broad theory. Our technique is not widely practiced, nor is it novel. Witness, for instance, Griswold's (2001) observation regarding studies "that accumulate so much evidence and subject it to such painstaking scrutiny that one cannot help but be convinced by them; the thesis is not so much argued as established" (p. 1828). In addition, the results need not be due to the work of one person or research group, but more likely will be a communal effort, as was the case for the studies of smoking (although obviously some were more prominent than others). In any event, these smoking studies would meet Griswold's observation of "a careful but relentless gathering and weighing of the evidence" (p. 1828). In similar fashion, Rosenbaum (2002) notes that "Scientific questions are not settled on a particular date by a single event, nor are they settled

irrevocably. We speak of the weight of evidence. Eventually, the weight is such that critics can no longer lift it, or are too weary to try. Overwhelming evidence is evidence that overwhelms responsible critics" (p. 11).

Bear in mind that the goal is not the "proving" of a theory, but something more like the "strong support" of a theory when there is a large body of evidence in favor and alternative explanations are very implausible. On this score, it is important to view our theories as probabilistic since we do not live in an ideal world and are often obliged to use less than ideal evidence. Theories will not always work out—even if they are "correct." This is implicitly recognized by Popper (2002), who observes that "non-reproducible single occurrences are of no significance to science. Thus a few stray basic statements contradicting a theory will hardly induce us to reject it as falsified" (p. 66). The widely held and warped image of what Popper meant by *falsification*—to wit, an unforgiving deterministic standard operating with precisely measured data—if actually followed, would sooner or later conclude that every theory is false. As a consequence, those who still adhere to this position (hopefully, a small and declining number) are enmeshed in an unreasonable and unacceptable standard that accomplishes nothing but harm. Even in the absence of errors in data, we can be confident that all theories can be shown to be false—simply because it is impossible to specify all possible conditions and, therefore, a literal interpretation of what a theory implies can be taken out of context and lead to a negative result (Lieberson 1998).

Third, the boundaries drawn between quantitative and qualitative analysis, as well as the boundaries between different methods more generally, do not justify the automatic denial of the potential value of any method. There is a distinction between the type of procedures that a researcher may favor and the consideration of data from all sources. If we are to generate as many implications of both a theory and its alternatives, then this means gathering as much data as possible to address the theoretical issues. Data are then tightly evaluated to help us draw a sound conclusion. The quality of the data becomes highly relevant as it is almost certain that there will be inconsistencies in the evidence. We are not naïve enough to think that we can expect researchers and theorists to work on all fronts, since they have their skills and dispositions, but the key point is that *all of the results should be incorporated and considered in the evaluation of the theory*. The distinction between a qualitative theory of some phenomena and a quantitative theory of

the same phenomena is artificial and nonproductive. If, however, different types of data persistently give different conclusions, then it is an appropriate challenge to think through the source of this inconsistency.

Finally, just as the initial efforts to evaluate a causal hypothesis or a theory can be viewed as a work in progress, so too should our analysis of implications. Several developments will help improve its utility: (1) the expansion and elaboration of the checklist we laid out in this paper. Undoubtedly, there are many other technical issues to consider when contradictions appear to exist. (2) We have to recognize that the social sciences operate with a distorted image of practices in the hard sciences. There is the tendency to assume that the quality of the evidence solely reflects the quality of the theory. If a theory is valid, there is an implicit expectation that one study (or at most, a handful) will yield evidence that is precise, crisp, and supportive of a parsimonious theory. At best, this will rarely occur and our evaluation of the theory is likely to be lowered because of it. The evidence certainly should reflect the theory, but it might also reflect unrelated circumstances—namely, the difficulty in obtaining the precise and accurate evidence that we assume should occur for a robust theory. Given the empirical obstacles in the social sciences, this can be an inappropriate expectation. Almost certainly there are other implicit assumptions about the linkage between theory and evidence that Implication Analysis needs to examine and root out. (3) We must adjust our standards by moving away from an *exclusive reliance* on mechanical ways of evaluating evidence such as tests of significance, predictive power; and variance explained. In our estimation, the jury trial model discussed earlier may well prove to be a more appropriate way of proceeding in the social sciences. This means evaluating a theory by using data from diverse sources, of different quality, and meeting different levels of confidence in their accuracy and relevance, and they are possibly somewhat contradictory. It is more a matter of weighing the evidence by piecing together a complex array of information. There is no simplistic rule for doing this. (See for example Ni Bhrolcháin and Dyson's [2007:29] use of the metaphor *bricolage* as "knitting together diverse strands of evidence.") Certainly, experiments (true ones or those based on observational data) would be important to consider. But the key step is that the evaluation is based on all of the evidence—albeit not equally. Note how this is very different from using experiments (real, statistical, or natural) as the information that trumps all other information. There is an inherent tension: On the one hand, formal mechanical

methods and standards convey a sense of objectivity and rigor: On the other hand, a formal set of rules cannot replace judgment and good sense that should be of help in evaluating the appropriateness of the evidence. The latter is hardly trivial, when one considers the reliance on data that is rarely of the form that we would ideally prefer.

In the same way that the hard sciences evolve and develop through the efforts of worker bees, so too should the social sciences recognize that worker bees are adding to a well-structured problem and the outcome is the product of all of the work. Great people exist, but their theories, as well as their syntheses of the existing work, are open to modification and are neither proven nor disproven with a given data set.

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COMMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF IMPLICATION ANALYSIS

*Glenn Firebaugh**

This smart article by Stanley Lieberson and Joel Horwich (this volume, p. 1) exhorts social scientists to judge theories more intentionally on the basis of their implied empirical consequences. Under Implication Analysis in the social sciences:

- We do not *test* theories—we *evaluate* them. Rarely if ever does a single "crucial test" establish or falsify a theory. Instead of futile searches for crucial tests, social scientists should evaluate theories on the basis of the weight of the evidence from a wide range of relevant evidence.
- We do not slavishly attempt to mimic what natural scientists do. The popular characterization of the natural science model—as an unproblematic sequence of processes usually involving an experiment—is largely a myth anyway. In the social sciences, as in the natural sciences, "there is no mechanical system that will escape judgment, sense, and intelligence" (Lieberson and Horwich [hereafter LH], p. 19).
- We are far more determined and resourceful in our attempts to draw out the empirical implications of theories. "A useful theory," LH write (p. 23), "should suggest a wide array of expansions." Spelling out the broader implications of a theory is important, first, for evaluating the theory and, second, for determining the theory's reach. "By considering the implications of a theory in broader terms and asking if the relevant evidence supports this theory, we are both evaluating the theory and considering the bounds under which the theory holds" (LH, p. 29).

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- We "bombard" the theoretical inferences with evidence. "The goal is straightforward: we should search for as many extensions and consequences of the theory and then evaluate these consequences by obtaining or developing relevant data. We are not usually oriented to thinking this way" (LH, p. 24). If the evidence is promising, we follow by bombarding the theory with alternatives—Is there an alternative theory that could account for the evidence as well as, or better than, the initial theory? (LH, pp. 22 ff.).

Are Lieberson and Horwich Right?

Yes, I believe they are in their core message. In fact, they may be the victims of the good sense of their message, as critics might aver that what they say is obvious—and that their advice is gratuitous, since sociologists are already following it. To those critics I would reply that my experience as editor of the *American Sociological Review* suggests otherwise. Many readers would be surprised by the number of manuscripts submitted to *ASR* describing empirical analyses that had little or no bearing on the theory or theories they were claiming to assess. (In other instances authors seemed to be blissfully unaware that their results *contradicted* their theory![1]) The best manuscripts submitted to *ASR*, to be sure, were careful to draw out a theory's empirical implications, and then to assess the theory on the basis of those implications. But we can, and should, do better. The question is how to train ourselves, and our students, at inferential work—an issue I return to later.

Implications of Implication Analysis

In the spirit of what LH advise us to do regarding the assessment of theories, I offer some musings regarding the likely consequences of Implication Analysis itself. Let me be clear: Social scientists would do well to heed this article. But there are a few kinks to work out.

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[1]Sometimes these problems slip past reviewers. Dozens of published sociological studies in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, concluded that foreign investment slows the economic growth of poor countries, even though their data famously showed the opposite (see Firebaugh 2008;70–73).

Nested Theories

LH note that theories differ in the size of their catchment areas—some theories are narrow and some are far-reaching. "In either case," they write (p. 23), "they should be approached in terms of gauging their range and potential value." Observe, however, that theories very often are nested, so by expanding the catchment area of a theory we switch to a broader theory. Consider the theory that smoking causes lung cancer. Is our interest in what causes lung cancer, or in what smoking causes? If it is the latter, then the smoking $\rightarrow$ lung cancer theory is embedded in a more general theory that smoking is harmful to your health. In that case an empirical link between smoking and lung cancer is only part of the story, whereas in the narrower theory the link between smoking and lung cancer is the whole story.

That theories may be nested within other theories is all the more reason to probe the boundaries of theories, as LH advise. In principle, Implication Analysis enables discovery of the more general or more universal theory. In practice, there are issues to resolve. Theories with limited reach by definition have fewer consequences, so those theories are easier to evaluate with data. The result is a built-in bias for assessing narrow theories. In effect we reverse the direction of the research arrow (theory $\rightarrow$ empirical consequences is replaced by consequences $\rightarrow$ theory) in order to create manageable research projects. (Of course, it is precisely this predilection for assessing narrow theories that LH are seeking to counter.)

Consider the social science theory that "Residential segregation harms minorities," chosen because of its similarity to the smoking-is-harmful example described in LH. The potential implications of the segregation theory are wide-ranging: Residential segregation harms the health of minorities. Residential segregation reduces the educational attainment of minorities. Residential segregation increases the risk that minorities will be crime victims. Residential segregation increases the risk of suicide among minorities. Residential segregation reduces the wealth of minorities by undercutting the value of their houses. Residential segregation reduces the employment prospects of minorities by creating a mismatch between residence and jobs. And so on. Evaluating all of these implications in a single study would require a Herculean effort to compile and analyze different types of data from many different sources. And, just as in the case of whether smoking is harmful, there are alternative explanations to consider.

We might, then, restrict ourselves to a single domain, such as the effect of residential segregation on health. Even then the task is daunting because the list of the possible health implications of segregation is long: mortality, chronic illness, low birth weight, obesity, to name a few. So, like a Russian doll, we pull apart this theory to reveal a smaller theory inside: "Residential segregation increases the risk of low birth weight among minorities." This is the sort of study one is most likely to encounter today in the social sciences.

Observe that what we have just done is directly contrary to the tenets of Implication Analysis. Instead of attempting to find a "wide array of expansions" (LH, p. 23), we circumscribe a theory to come up with a less extensive and more manageable array of expansions.[2]

We might ask, then, what is the best strategy for applying Implication Analysis to nested theories? Do we advance by accretion? That is suggested by LH's remark that the social science enterprise is communal and by their "worker bee" imagery at the end of the article. We each do a piece, and it somehow adds up (without a queen bee). Or we start small (in a first study we might establish that segregation increases the risk of low birth weight babies among minorities) and elaborate later (in subsequent studies we expand the theory to other types of health outcomes, and then to other domains, such as education, employment, and crime).

Or would we be better served by a "big push" strategy? Under this strategy we would see abstracts that begin with sentences such as "In this article we evaluate three dozen key implications of the theory that residential segregation harms minorities in the United States." Adopting this strategy would encourage big science, since even in the simplest case the thorough evaluation of a theory would require multiple methods, multiple data sets and, most likely, multiple investigators. Or we might follow a compromise strategy, in which research articles follow this format: Statement of the general theory, with all its central implications; the piece of the theory addressed in the study, aligned with the relevant subset of implications; comparison of empirical results to relevant subset of implications. This format would help us to keep our eye on the big picture (the general theory) without placing excessive demands on researchers to do everything at once.

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[2]This should not be confused with the point that LH make (p. 42) that the broader the theory, the greater the likelihood of finding inconsistent evidence.

Causal Mechanisms

Implication Analysis forces us to think about causal mechanisms. The statement that "living on a hill causes low birth weight" is vapid, for example, unless we can give some defensible reason why higher elevation would have that consequence. Similarly, the theory that residential segregation causes low birth weight among minorities is uninteresting unless we can give a plausible account of why birth weight would be affected by segregation.[3] In other words, implications and causal mechanisms go hand in hand—a causal implication must be justified by some sort of plausible causal chain. If we are serious about Implication Analysis, then, we should expect more theorizing about mechanisms, since the more implications, the more causal chains we theorize.

My point here is that an implication is not an implication (or not an interesting one) until it is linked to a plausible mechanism. What is critical here is that mechanisms be *posited*; they may or may not be measured. In the case of smoking and lung cancer, for example, the causal link between smoking and lung cancer was established by observational data before we understood the physiological pathways. Still, a theoretical case could be made for the pathways: It makes sense that a foreign substance in one's lungs over extended periods could have adverse health effects, so a plausible account could be given even before we knew the details.

Examples such as this make me think that there are exceptions to LH's rule (p. 7) that "If there is a mildly complex set of mechanisms, then the implications should be explicitly evaluated in appropriate piecemeal fashion." The process by which smoke in the lungs functions as a carcinogen involves, I suspect, at least a mildly complex set of mechanisms. Yet, as LH mention elsewhere in their article, the conclusion that smoking causes lung cancer was not delayed pending an evaluation of those within-lung mechanisms "in appropriate piecemeal fashion."

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[3]Segregation might be linked to birth weight by affecting the upkeep of amenities in a city, such as parks and sidewalks, which affect the "walkability" of neighborhoods, and thus the physical exercise of residents. In addition, segregation might affect the location of health-relevant institutions such as bars/liquor stores, tobacco outlets, and fast food restaurants on the one hand, and health clinics on the other. Or segregation might affect the emergence of collective community properties (e.g., a neighborhood's "collective efficacy") and those properties in turn might affect health practices in a neighborhood.

Natural Experiments: Or, Some Implications Are More Consequential Than Others

LH give two compelling examples of the use of implication analysis outside sociology: smoking and lung cancer, and how cholera is spread. By the middle of the twentieth century there was accumulating evidence of a causal link between smoking and lung cancer. In one study, for example, Drs. Richard Doll and Bradford Hill sent questionnaires about smoking habits to all 60,000 doctors in England in 1951, receiving replies from about 40,000. Over ensuing years they used data from the British registration system to calculate the death rates of the respondents. For men the death rate from lung cancer was *24 times* higher for heavy smokers than for nonsmokers (Doll and Hill 1954; subsequent studies of other populations yielded similar results).

Alternative explanations must be ruled out. It was not clear, for example, whether the causal agent was tobacco itself, or the arsenic applied to tobacco as an insecticide. Enter Implication Analysis. It turns out that arsenic is not used on tobacco in Turkey, so if arsenic is the culprit we expect lower lung cancer rates in Turkey, where arsenic is absent.[4]

What I find arresting about this example is that it is based on a naturally occurring or "natural" experiment.[5] Interestingly, the other major example LH give from outside sociology—the cholera example—*also rests on a natural experiment.* John Snow certainly realized this point. In his own words (Snow 1855:74–75, quoted in Freedman 1991:297):

> Each company supplies both rich and poor, both large houses and small; there is no difference either in the condition or occupation of the persons receiving the water

[4]I would call this a crucial test of the arsenic theory. In fact, LH go on to describe a series of what I would regard as crucial tests pitting the smoking theory against alternative explanations (e.g., that the causal agent is the petrol lighters used by smokers). Perhaps it is a matter of what one means by the term "crucial test," but I believe LH are too quick to dismiss the value of such tests.

[5]The term "natural experiment" does not mean that *nature* necessarily makes the assignments, but that assignments are not done for the sake of randomization, as they would be in a controlled experiment. In the case of London water companies, for example, the companies—not nature—decided where to draw water from the Thames. In doing so they inadvertently set up a natural experiment for Snow to exploit.

of the different Companies . . . . As there is no differ-
ence whatever in the houses or the people receiving the
supply of the two Water Companies, or in any of the
physical conditions with which they are surrounded, it
is obvious that no experiment could have been devised
which would more thoroughly test the effect of water
supply on the progress of cholera than this, which cir-
cumstances placed ready made before the observer.

The experiment, too, was on the grandest scale.
No fewer than three hundred thousand people of both
sexes, of every age and occupation, and of every rank
and station, from gentlefolks down to the very poor,
were divided into two groups without their choice, and
in most cases, without their knowledge; one group
being supplied with water containing the sewage of
London, and amongst it, whatever might have come
from the cholera patients, the other group having water
quite free from such impurity.

The lesson here, as I see it, is that some implications are more
consequential than others, and that natural experiments generally line
up with implications that fall in the "more consequential" category. An
important implication of Implication Analysis, then, is that we should
try harder to find relevant natural experiments. It may be the case, as
LH say (p. 18), that "relatively few of the questions of interest to social
scientists are likely to align with such rare events." If so, why tease us
with examples based on natural experiments (no arsenic on tobacco
in Turkey; London water companies that tap into different places on
the Thames)? More important, a defeatist attitude about natural ex-
periments seems contrary to the stubborn "let's find the implications"
spirit of their article. Economist Trygve Haavelmo (1944:14) spoke of
the "stream of experiments that nature is steadily turning out from her
own enormous laboratory," and as sociologists we have not been very
imaginative or determined in tapping this stream (for a few examples
of the use of natural experiments in sociology, see Firebaugh [2008,
ch. 7]). Economists have been more aggressive in searching for natural
experiments to exploit, as witness the numerous attempts to use such

experiments as the basis for instrumental variables in economic research (Angrist and Krueger 2001).

What Are We to Do?

The LH article is exemplary in its discussion of the social science research enterprise, and it will be standard fare in graduate methods courses. Nonetheless I was left with a few questions. Let me close with those questions. First, in addition to the criteria listed in Figure 1 in LH, what other guidance can we give for deriving powerful implications? (As I already noted, implications involving natural experiments tend to be especially telling, so I would advise researchers to search for relevant natural experiments.) How do we teach inferential skills? Should we require courses in logic? What would a course on Implication Analysis look like?

Finally, would research articles broaden significantly if we followed more closely the dictates of Implication Analysis? Consider again this hypothetical first sentence for an abstract: "In this article we evaluate three dozen key implications of the theory that residential segregation harms minorities in the United States." Is this the wave of the future in sociology?

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COMMENT: BULLY FOR PREDICTION

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> In general, little is gained when theories are evaluated by combining unrealistic standards with less than ideal data, and employing methods that rest on unrealistic assumptions. (Liberson and Horwich, this volume, p. 19)

No one could quarrel with this sentiment. The question is whether it is an accurate indictment of current reseach practice in sociology, or simply a reminder that the idealized notion of scientific method that used to appear in positivistic elementary texts is sadly out of date and a poor guide to doing research.

While I as much as anyone have criticized those who identify conventional statistical approaches as the most satisfying research strategy for identifying causation in complex social sequences, and attacked the poverty of Millian logic when used in social science (Goldstone 1997, 1998, 2003), I do not believe that striving for fidelity to an idealized scheme of theory/experiment/proof is a general problem in sociological methods. In my experience, the best scholars who are applying statistical techniques to analyze complex social problems do so with a great appreciation of inferential pitfalls, the flaws in underlying models, and the need to think critically about both the implications of the theory being tested and the implications of their statistical results (Hout 1989; Massey 1993; Sampson et al. 2002; Lieberson 1980; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Lieberson and Horwich offer much sage advice that is valuable to keep in mind, but I am surprised by their claim that their advice is not being followed by the current generation of sociologists.

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Lieberson and Horwich claim that there is a misleading "hard science" model of theory testing that is leading sociologists astray. No doubt, one reading of Popperian falsification theory (Popper 2002), or Kuhnian paradigm shift theory (Kuhn 1962), seems to imply that science advances when theories face the dramatic and crucial test of experiments, which then pronounce them falsified, and hence to be dismissed, or allow them to live to face further tests on other days.

Yet these oversimplified schema have largely been supplanted by more sophisticated views of natural science that see progress take place through competition among diverse research programs (Lakatos 1978), which do not simply throw up their hands and surrender in the face of falsification. Rather, the *raison d'être* of research programs is to elaborate the implications of their guiding theories, collecting evidence of varying types and qualities that confirms key tenets, and devising revisions and alterations and additions to the guiding theory when some implications meet with unanticipated results.

For example, in one of the oldest possible examples, we might think that Newton's theory of gravity was "confirmed" by its ability to predict the observed orbits of the planets, or by its ability to derive such observed regularities as Kepler's laws. Not at all; lots of different observational schemes fit the observed data (including Tycho Brahe's model of an earth-centered system with the sun carrying the rest of the planets around it), and there is nothing that "proved" gravity was responsible for the observed order. What really convinced most scientists that Newton's theory of gravity was right were the implications of that theory for observations much closer to home, namely its explanations for the tides and its prediction of an oblate spheroid shape for the earth.[1]

Similarly, there was no "crucial experiment" to demonstrate the validity of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. That has gained validity only slowly because of the accumulation of fragmentary but mounting evidence verifying diverse implications of that theory for many regions and populations (Gould 2002).

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[1] While Newton's *Principles of Natural Philosophy* was published in 1687, it was not until French surveyors returned from Lapland with evidence that the shape of the earth could only be explained by the effects of its own gravity on a rapidly rotating sphere (hence bulging at the middle and flattened on top) that Newton's theory made inroads over Descartes' alternative mechanical model, and this in the 1730s.

I believe that most sociologists, and certainly most leading and influential sociologists, by now have come to know and appreciate these observations, and they are not easily led astray by fetishism of experiments or statistical signficance. Rather, they see themselves as contributing to research programs that advance by drawing out and collecting evidence regarding the diverse implications of varied conjectures and theories, or by confronting and rethinking our ideas based on new observations and novel ideas.

Implication Analysis, as advanced in Lieberson and Horwich's essay, is thus—as the authors admit—"not novel." But neither does it lack wide application, as the authors claim. I would submit that it is a far more common mode of theory advance than the use of "crucial experiments," or simple theory testing for falsification, in both the natural and the social sciences (Berger and Zelditch 2002).

In my own field (and maybe in others if I knew them better?), the leading scholars are always asking: "If my theory of phenomenon X is correct, what should I observe in societies A and B and C?" and then seeking and examining evidence regarding those implications. They are *not* seeking to "prove" that their theories are correct in *all* cases, in a pseudo-natural scientific sort of way. If we look at recent winners of the ASA Distinguished Scholarship Award, specifically the books by Randall Collins (1998) and Mounira Charrad (2001), this is exactly how they proceed. Or more accurately, they start with a set of observations, suggest a theory to explain them, and then provide additional data to show that the implications of the theory are realized in additional times and places. Their version of "correct" for their theories is something like "This is a better explanation than we have now (of the development of rival philosophic schools, or women's roles in developing societies), and I can demonstrate that it's better by examining the implications and observed patterns in a variety of oft-noted cases." They do not aim for either universal explanation (which is likely unobtainable) or rigorous logical proof (which would be an inaccurate portrayal of the plastic social world).

Perhaps the best evidence that much of this paper is "old news" is the examples that the authors present: the studies by Halle, Lamont, Nee, and others. Since these are examples of sociologists seeking extensive implications—*not* examples of leading analyses that fell short in some way by not using implication analysis—it seems clear that the best scholars are already pursuing this approach full bore.

Perhaps Lieberson and Horwich see too many journal submissions in which authors do simply try to test propositions with weak data, data that do not meet the assumptions of the mode of analysis, or draw oversized conclusions from modest analyses. I could say, on the contrary, that I see too many journal submissions in which authors are simply drawing out implications from the work of Marx, Weber, or Durkheim and showing how some patch of social data or observations fits the pattern of the master. I agree that sociology could use some fresh thinking about methods, but I do not believe that simply moving people away from an idealized (and I think no longer so influential) natural science model of scientific procedures is the answer.

Lieberson and Horwich also overstate the degree to which the natural sciences get by without experiment and prediction. It is an error to treat meteorology, evolution, astronomy, and geology as "nonexperimental" sciences and to suggest that sociology is too attracted to models drawn from the "hard" experimental natural sciences. In fact, you cannot take a first-year geology class without doing a host of experiments on rocks to determine their structure and chemical make-up. While many of the experiments in meteorology are laboratory or computer model simulations, the study of the ocean's currents and of atmospheric physics are based on thousands upon thousands of experiments on the physics of gases, fluid flow, temperature conduction, and the like. Would that social scientists informed one-hundreth of their social theories from the information based on psychology experiments, as astronomers, geologists, and meteorologists inform their theories from experiments on gases, fluids, crystals![2] How would we analyze the composition of distant stars from their spectra if we could not experimentally produce spectra of specific chemicals in the lab? Darwin's evolutionary theory may have first been drawn from observational nonexperimental evidence, but it has been immeasurably refined and strengthened by experiments in genetics. Generations of lab-raised fruit flies have proved as valuable a source of insights on evolution as the natural history of the Galapagos. It is the intelligent combination of experiment

[2]The award of the Noble Prize in Economics to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith for efforts to apply experimental studies of individuals' revealed preference structures to economic theory, which had previously avoided this, suggests a promising opening in this direction.

and prediction with assiduous pursuit of implications and their examination that has led science forward, not experiment or Implication Analysis alone.

If there is a problem of method in sociology that is barring the advance of theory and knowledge, I do not think that Implication Analysis will solve it. Or rather, the already wide use of Implication Analysis by leading scholars has not solved it to date. More importantly, steering sociologists away from thinking about prediction is likely counterproductive.

Rather, I would lean the other way, and suggest that sociologists do not give sufficient emphasis to the role of experiment and prediction in their research. What I mean by this is not that sociologists should return to the lab—not at all. Rather, what I mean is that sociologists should give more attention to efforts to *predict and test their ideas on "out of sample" populations*. In my experience, journal editors are loath to accept papers that simply hypothesize about things yet to be observed, or about characteristics of populations outside their data. That is considered "speculation" and "unscientific." Yet the opposite is true—science *thrives* on informed speculation. Elementary particle physics advances precisely by trying to predict the characteristics of yet-to-be-observed particles, and building experiments to try to produce those particles so those predictions can be examined. Biologists published many guesses about the structure of DNA, based on partial and fragmentary evidence, before Crick and Watson hit upon a structure that had the requisite properties and was consistent with that evidence. Astronomers predicted black holes long before they were observed (or inferred from actual observations).

One of the most valuable activities in the natural sciences is using partial and fragmentary data, in conjunction with theory, to make predictions about things that should be observed *outside* the existing base of observations. That is implication analysis with a vengeance, and it is all too rare in the social sciences. In the social sciences, our predilections are to try to explain the complex patterns and relationships we see in particular data sets (and we all know that censuses, ethnographies, and cross-national data compilations provide many of those). Economists seek to explain patterns of growth, sociologists to explain patterns of social mobility, political scientists to explain patterns of voting. To be sure, political scientists venture to predict election outcomes, and economists

to forecast next year's economic growth or unemployment figures. Yet the accuracy of such predictions is never taken as establishing the worth of the underlying theories—if it did, there would be few such theories still around, or theorists would be working much harder on the real-world predictive success of those theories than on their internal logical elaboration. Those errors are taken as a reasonable outcome of what are, after all, just informed guesses to different populations, unfair tests of "generalization" of theories that were derived from particular places and times. That is fine, but isn't advancing theories in good part learning how to build propositions regarding relationships that hold in larger—or better typologized clusters of—populations? What good would a theory of evolution or gravity be if it held for only certain distinct populations or time periods?

I hope I might be forgiven for citing my own experience on this score, but it seems relevant. In 1999, Bert Useem and I published a theory of prison riots, based on following the implications of theories of revolution to the "micro-society" of prisons (Goldstone and Useem 1999). One further implication of this work was that private prisons were more likely to have problems maintaining order in high-security settings than state-run facilities. Our draft included a prediction that New Mexico, because it had just embarked on an exceptional path of turning over high-security prisons to private control, would likely suffer an increased incidence of prison riots. But that portion of our draft was deleted, as the editors felt it was "too speculative." Within a year from publication of our essay, New Mexico experienced riots in three of its new private prisons. Useem and I were able to do a retrospective analysis of data on the New Mexico prison riots and demonstrate that their causes and unfolding indeed conformed to our theory. Yet it would have been a far more powerful examination of the implications of the theory of revolutions for other settings if we had been able to publish a prediction of yet unseen events, and have it subsequently confirmed, rather than simply to fit the events to the theory after they occurred.

Of course, it may well be that the social world is just *different*, that generalizations across meaningfully large stretches of time and space just cannot and will not be found. But how will we ever know unless we are willing to share and publish theories based on our predictions, and hold our theories accountable if things do not turn out as suggested? Maybe a little more prediction would be a very good thing.

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COMMENT: IMPLICATION ANALYSIS: NEW APPROACH OR GOOD, OLD-FASHIONED SOCIOLOGY?

*Mark S. Mizruchi**

For nearly half a century, Stanley Lieberson has been among the most creative, innovative, and broad scholars in our discipline. From a study of the division of labor among banks (1961)—in which he anticipated the field of economic sociology well before its time—to studies of the military-industrial complex (1971) and leadership succession (Lieberson and O'Connor 1972), to his magisterial classic on race, *A Piece of the Pie* (1980), Lieberson has provided a continuing stream of significant accomplishments, in the finest tradition of theoretically salient, methodologically rigorous social science.

In the 1980s, Lieberson stepped back and began to address a set of long-standing concerns that he had harbored about our enterprise. In *Making it Count* (1985), he raised questions about the quasi-experimental methods used in most quantitative sociological research. In subsequent years he continued his groundbreaking empirical work, most recently with an innovative study using the proliferation of first names to examine processes of cultural change (2000). But Lieberson has spent much, if not most, of his energy—including his term as ASA president (see Lieberson 1992)—addressing issues regarding how to improve the way we use empirical data in sociological research.

In "Implication Analysis," Lieberson, with Joel Horwich (this volume, p. 1), continues with the theme first enunciated in *Making it*

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Count. The paper is wide-ranging, and defies easy summary, but the authors' argument goes something like this: Sociologists have spent considerable energy attempting to mimic the natural sciences. These attempts are misplaced, in part because they are based on a misconception of what natural scientists actually do, and in part because such methods are inappropriate for sociology in any case. Ironically, the authors suggest, sociologists hold one another to standards of proof that not even natural scientists require. We often reject theories due to a single negative empirical finding, when the finding merely suggests the need to narrow our scope conditions. At other times we make claims for our theories that our data simply fail to justify. The problem is that we typically fail to make clear the links among our theory, hypotheses, and data. If our goal is to use empirical evidence to test and evaluate theories, we can improve our approach by carefully considering the implications of our theories and then "in turn, ascertaining how closely the empirical evidence meets these implications" (p. 3). The authors' approach for doing this, which they call "Implication Analysis," involves three steps. First, researchers must identify the implications of a theory for a broad range of conditions (including different populations, times, and places) and then examine them empirically. Second, they should consider whether the evidence is consistent with an alternative theory. Third, if neither of the first two steps yields a clear conclusion, then the researchers must "evaluate and compare the evidence supporting the initial theory and the alternative causal accounts" (p. 22).

There is little with which to disagree in this paper, and the strengths are numerous. The discussion of actually existing science, as opposed to sociologists' caricatured view of how the enterprise occurs, may not be news to those well-versed in the sociology of science (for example, see Knorr Cetina [1999]; Latour [1987]; Owen-Smith [2001]), but it is very well-taken. The fact that discovery in the hard sciences is as much inductive as deductive should be a lesson to us that it is acceptable to publish a finding that was not deduced from an author's up-front theoretical framing. Such an admission would, I suspect, greatly reduce the frequency of hypotheses being "tested" on results one has already seen, a practice that I fear is a common occurrence in our field. The authors' point that even regression results are based on counterfactual thinking, while also not new, is a gem. And the plea for us to relax our obsession with achieving "correct" results is welcome as well, as is the

point that even multiple negative findings do not demonstrate that a theory is wrong.

I do have one nagging question, however: Is the target set by the authors a fair one, or is it as much a caricature of actually existing sociology as are many sociologists' views of the hard sciences? Have the authors, in making their very compelling argument, constructed a straw man against which to make it? I think they have. What Lieberson and Horwich are criticizing is not sociology *per se*, but *bad* sociology. I believe that good sociology, of which there are many examples, exhibits exactly the qualities the authors are promoting.

Let's begin with the authors' discussion of what they call "limits," or what are more commonly referred to as scope conditions. "We need to know," the authors state, "the conditions under which the implications of a theory might be expected to operate" (p. 11). Lieberson and Horwich are correct to note that authors are not always explicit about the limits of their claims. On the other hand, it is hardly fair to accuse most contemporary sociologists of being unaware of this point. Such awareness is often implicit to be sure. But few sociologists make the grand claims for the scope of their theories that Lieberson and Horwich suggest that they do.

This point carries over to a second accusation made by the authors. Lieberson and Horwich correctly note that "if the evidence for a theory is inconclusive, the absence of the affirmation does not necessarily mean that the theory is either false or valid—it means we do not know" (p. 10). This is true. But does any sociologist ever claim that his or her evidence is conclusive? Many of us would like to believe we are right, of course, but do even the most dogmatic among us admit to the certainty of any conclusion? There indeed are "other plausible interpretations besides a poorly generated hypothesis" (p. 10). One's data are sometimes of poor quality, and variables can be difficult to measure. But is any of this news?

The critique of sociologists' attempts to simulate experimental conditions is similarly unfair. Lieberson and Horwich correctly note that attempts to conduct randomized experiments are often flawed. Discussing clinical trials in medical research, the authors list a number of problems, including the absence of true randomization, subjects' failure to complete the trials, inadequate sample sizes, and the possibility that the effects of a trial can differ among subpopulations (p. 16). These are indeed problems, and, as the authors note, they can affect sociological

analyses as well, as in studies of the effects of school class size on student performance, in which particularly acute parents press to have their children included in the smaller classes.[1] But because not all researchers follow the appropriate protocol does not mean that the protocol itself is the problem. It is true that we can never achieve perfect randomization, nor can we prevent subjects from exiting a study, but techniques exist for measuring the effects of unbalanced sampling and attrition.[2] And if we have reason to believe that a test condition will have differential effects on subgroups within a population, we can test for interaction effects. In short, all of the problems of the quasi-experimental method mentioned by the authors can be avoided, or at least minimized, through careful attention to standard research techniques.

Then there is the matter of alternative explanations, a major issue for the authors. It is incumbent upon researchers, Lieberson and Horwich suggest, to generate "possible alternative explanations that might explain the observed events *without reliance* on the theory under study" (p. 21; emphasis in the original). Lieberson and Horwich stress that this must be distinguished from the use of significance tests to examine a null hypothesis. Rather, the focus must be on examining an alternative causal theory. Perhaps I misunderstand the authors, but is not examining an alternative causal theory precisely what the use of control variables does? Consider the authors' example, from W. G. Cochran's classic discussion of the effects of cigarette smoking on lung cancer. To thoroughly test the theory that smoking causes lung cancer, we must do "more than simply [compare] the death rates of smokers and nonsmokers" (p. 20). "It means," the authors continue

> comparing a wide variety of conditions: persons who smoked different amounts, for comparable lengths of time; smokers who smoked the same amount, but started at different ages; ex-smokers who had stopped

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[1]Sample size is actually less of a problem in sociology than in medical research, since sociological studies typically do not require the ingestion of potentially intrusive drugs, the drawing of blood, or physical confinement.

[2]See, for example, the work of Rosenbaum (2002), who developed an approach for estimating the extent to which differential selection into a treatment group—as in the school class size example—renders an observed treatment effect spurious. Lieberson and Horwich cite Rosenbaum in their paper, but do not mention this technique.

recently and those who had stopped earlier; and so
forth. (p. 20)

It is evident from this that Cochran was considering the impli-
cations of the smoking theory from a number of different angles. Yet
how would one answer these questions analytically? We would need to
consider not simply whether a person smoked or did not smoke—an ex-
tremely crude distinction that few would take seriously—but rather, two
important variables: length of time spent smoking and level of smok-
ing. We would also want to consider a third variable—age of onset of
smoking—and two others—whether a person had stopped smoking and
for how long. In addition, we might want to examine interaction effects,
such as that between cessation of smoking and years since cessation.

There are some estimation issues that would have to be consid-
ered to examine this model. Regardless of the particular technique we
use, however, this discussion suggests the need for some kind of mul-
tivariate regression approach. After all, what does it mean to say that
we will compare smokers who smoked the same amount but started at
different ages? It means that we will examine the effect of age at onset,
controlling for the amount that a person smoked. This might require
a sample selection model, in that only some people begin smoking in
the first place, only those subjects can be compared in this analysis, and
smokers do not represent a random segment of the full population. But
even sample selection models operate within a traditional multivariate
analysis framework.

It is interesting that Lieberson and Horwich rely so heavily on
medical research, while giving few examples of sociological work. Their
discussion of sociological works—Gerber and Hout on Nee's market
transition theory, and Erickson, Halle, and Lamont on Bourdieu's the-
ory of the role of cultural capital—involves scope conditions rather than
alternative explanations of a phenomenon. Meanwhile, the authors fail
to provide a single example of a sociological work that exhibits the
faults that they attribute to our field. Lieberson is understandably re-
luctant to attack particular writings. He and Horwich prefer to speak in
generalities, presumably to avoid insulting their colleagues. Why single
out an individual author for a sin of which most of us are guilty? The
problem is, by neglecting to show an example in which an author com-
mits the errors about which Lieberson and Horwich write, it raises the

possibility that such cases are difficult to find. And I believe that they are. I cannot imagine being able to publish an article in a leading refereed journal without paying careful attention to the link between one's theory and one's hypotheses, between one's concepts and one's operational definitions of them, the quality of one's data and measures, and (most importantly) potential alternative explanations for one's findings. This hardly means that published works, even those in our best journals, are immune from criticism. No work is perfect. Hypotheses can be dissected on logical grounds. The validity of one's measures is often a basis for criticism, especially when testing the most interesting theories. Data sets and measures can be open to question. And no matter how many control variables are used, it is almost always possible to come up with an alternative explanation for an author's findings. Yet to say that sociologists typically fail to address these problems is simply not true. At best, the frequency of such omissions should be subjected to systematic assessment.

I am not saying that Lieberson and Horwich are providing bad advice, nor am I denying that we could do a better job than we do of considering the implications of our theories. When sociologists examine control variables, we often do fail to regard them as alternative theories, with their own implications. Instead, we tend to treat them as nuisances that get in the way of our own account. But this is not so much a logical problem with the way we conduct our research. Rather, it is a substantive problem with the relative emphasis we place on particular variables when evaluating our findings. Should we pay more attention to these implications? We absolutely should. More and better thinking is always a good idea. But again, our failure to consider these implications, to the extent that it is a problem at all, is not one of method but of substantive focus.

Stanley Lieberson has produced a body of distinguished sociological work, but he has also expressed disappointment with the state of our field. Unlike many critics, however, Lieberson's goals are constructive, and his message is optimistic. Rather than trying to tear down the entire enterprise, he has implored us to be more aware of what we are doing. It is true that we sociologists can be careless about what we do, and it is true that we do not always think through the implications of our theories. The question is whether this is a problem with our methods *per se*, or the fact that we do not always practice what we were taught, or what we ourselves preach.

Lieberson and Horwich have provided a set of principles with which few of us would quarrel: Think deeply about the implications

of our theories and the hypotheses they imply. Pay careful attention to the quality of our data, including the extent to which our observations represent the populations we are trying to understand. Devise measures that accurately reflect the concepts we purport to be measuring. Carefully consider, and think through, the possible alternative explanations for our findings. Be attuned to the conditions under which our theories do and do not apply. And retest our theories on as many different data sets, in as many contexts, as we can.

We know that we are supposed to conduct our work in this fashion, and we do not always live up to our ideals. That Lieberson has done so more often than the rest of us—his examination of multiple explanations for the fate of African-Americans, in *A Piece of the Pie*, is an exemplar of the kind of analysis he advocates—does not mean that he has used any particularly unique set of tools. The principles set forth in this paper are ones that we would do well to follow. But they are fully consistent with what most of us have already been taught.

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COMMENT: IMPLICATION ANALYSIS AS ABDUCTIVE INFERENCE

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It is a pleasure to thank the editor of *Sociological Methodology* for the kind invitation to comment on the interesting paper on "Implication Analysis: A Pragmatic Proposal for Linking Theory and Data in the Social Science by Lieberson and Horwich (LH; this volume: p. 1). In our opinion, LH ask all the right questions about missing ingredients in the process of weighing evidence in the generation and testing of sociological theories. However, their paper falls substantially short of what it might have achieved in responding to the issues raised. This criticism applies not only to LH, but also to Ni Bhrolchain and Dyson (2007), whose checklist for assessing evidence in demography is highlighted by LH in their outline of how "Implication Analysis" should develop.

In our view, the root of the problem lies in the overemphasis through much of the social science literature on a dichotomy in the logic of inference—namely, induction and deduction. Neither of these forms of inference, alone or in combination, provides an adequate basis for the weighing and integration of evidence of disparate types and varying quality that LH would like to see. Missing from the discussion in LH, and throughout the sociological literature, is a treatment of *abduction*, or "inference to the best explanation." This form of inference has roots in the 17th century (Hobbs 2006), but was explicitly formalized by Charles Sanders Pierce in the 1870s and further developed by him (Pierce 1955). Abduction represents the reasoning that goes on in much of science— physical, biological, and social—and in everyday life, although it is rarely identified as the mode of inference that is actually being used.

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What exactly is abduction, and how does it differ from deduction and induction? The central idea is that a body of data provides evidence for a hypothesis that satisfactorily explains or accounts for that data, or at least provides evidence if the hypothesis is better than explanatory alternatives. In Pierce's original formulation he characterizes abductive reasoning as follows:

The surprising fact, Q, is observed:
But if P were true, Q would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that P is true.

Pierce indicates that "in pure abduction, it can never be justifiable to accept the hypothesis otherwise than as an interrogation." There must be an evaluation scheme for choosing among possible abductive inferences.

In *deduction* we start with a proposition, P, and if P implies Q, then we conclude Q. In *induction*, we start with a number of instances of P and Q together with other considerations and conclude that P implies Q. In somewhat more graphic language, but still at this abstract level, Pierce in 1878 put forth the following illustration of the distinction between the three forms of inference we are considering (Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 1988):

Deduction

Rule: All the beans from this bag are white.
Case: These beans are from this bag.
Therefore, Result: These beans are white.

Induction

Case: These beans are from this bag
Result: These beans are white.
Therefore, Rule: All the beans from this bag are white.

Abduction

Rule: All the beans from this bag are white.
Result: These beans are white.
Therefore, Case: These beans are from this bag.

The idea of abduction has been developed in the philosophy literature over the past 50 years (Harmon 1965, Lipton, 2004). However, the philosophy literature *per se* still leaves us at some distance from the delineation of abductive inference in concrete settings of the form discussed by LH.

The beginning of a new level of specificity occurred at the dawn of the development of expert systems in computer science (Lederberg 1987). Indeed, the first expert system, DENDRAL, developed by Joshua Lederberg, Edward Feigenbaum, Bruce Buchanan, Carl Djerassi, and others (Lindsay et al. 1993) was designed to automatically carry out inferences (using mass spectrometry data) to the best explanation (specifying organic molecules consistent with the mass spectrometry measurements). The task of writing computer programs to do the inferential process forced a precision of thought about abduction that had been absent from prior literature.

Subsequent expert systems focused on medical diagnosis (Shortliffe 1976; Buchanan and Shortliffe 1984; Sager et al. 1994), where we can readily characterize the reasoning of physicians in diagnosing an illness as a process of abduction. The precision of thought in weighing evidence of different types and quality—for example, laboratory assays, narrative patient histories, qualitative appraisal of a patient's physical condition, comparisons with published and archived histories of similar cases—that was forced on computer science people who were developing software as a diagnostic aid served to advance our understanding of abduction. An informative history of the successive stages involved in computerization of abductive inference on a diversity of scientific problems is given in Josephson and Josephson (1994).

What is missing from the above brief summary is any discussion of assessment of quality of evidence of different types, and its formal incorporation in the inference process *per se*. For this, a useful starting point is John Venn's *The Logic of Chance* (Venn 1888), and more recent literature (Good 1950; Kane 1992; Hobbs et al. 1993; Gaizauskas and Wilks 1998; Katz and Singer 2007), which leads naturally to the notion of *veritas* rankings (scoring) to indicate an investigator's subjective appraisal of the trustworthiness of a given piece of evidence. Indeed, all evidence to be weighed in an inferential process should be accompanied by *veritas* scores and the publication/posting online of the data/evidence being rated so that there is full transparency about this critical step in the inference process.

A limiting feature of the above examples is that the evidential base, and the nature of the questions asked, are less complex than many of the sociological examples mentioned by LH. To move toward greater relevance for sociology, it is useful to consider the use of abductive inference in the context of intelligence investigations. This is a setting that has stimulated numerous methodological advances in assessments of veracity and the weighing and combining of diverse forms of evidence with the objective of getting to a most defensible explanation for a given body of heterogeneous evidence and ruling out rival alternatives (Hobbs 2006).

In a recent analysis of a long-standing controversy about the possible use of chemical and/or biological weapons (CBW) in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan in the 1970s, Katz and Singer (2007) introduced a seven-step abductive strategy for integrating a complex mixture of qualitative and quantitative data. The objective was to establish, in a transparent fashion, that one among a range of plausible hypotheses was best supported by available evidence. Although their detailed analysis focuses on a CBW investigation, the basic strategy is relevant to Implication Analysis at the broad scale described by LH. The basic strategy proceeds as follows:

1. Divide the evidence into categories of distinct types of information. In the CBW investigation mentioned above, there were 12 categories of evidence: (a) toxicological analysis, (b) intelligence reports, (c) Hmong interviews, (d) medical records, (e) Soviet-link evidence, (f) investigator interviews, (g) attack data, (h) coincidence analysis, (i) methodology of conduct of the CBW investigation, (j) autopsy results, (k) open-source documents, and (l) sampling methods. The pieces of evidence in these categories ranged across laboratory microbiology, military messages and cables, interview accounts of airplane attacks, etc. The key point here is that the evidence is of diverse character and requires an integrated analysis as a process of inference to the best explanation.

2. Assign a *veritas* ranking to each category of evidence, based on a combination of dubiousness and degree of fallacy. The distinction between these two notions is that assessment of dubiousness requires an appraisal of ambiguity or likelihood, while degree of fallacy requires an appraisal of possible deception, or purposeful introduction of falsity. Quantifying dubiousness has a considerable history (Venn 1888;

Kane 1992), including the measurement of "dubiety" (degree of dubiousness) in measurements of the velocity of light (Dorsey 1944). In the context of a CBW investigation, making fine distinctions in degree of belief and assigning numerical weights or probabilities to categories of evidence when determination of error and level of ambiguity is fluid is not feasible. Thus, the CBW study relied on a system of ranks. Each category of evidence was assigned a "degree of dubiousness" score and a fallacy score. The sum of these scores was assigned a rank of low, medium, or high, thereby specifying an overall *veritas* rank. Because of the subjective judgment that enters into these scores, we feel that it is imperative to make primary data available in a publicly accessible file so that others may challenge the rationale of the judgments used (Katz and Singer 2007), and introduce alternative appraisals and potentially different conclusions. We feel that this kind of transparency is lacking in much social science research where significant judgments are involved. From our perspective, transparency and explicitness in subjective judgments needs to be an integral part of the abductive inference process and in any refinements of Implication Analysis.

    3. Specify multiple plausible hypotheses, a step nicely put forth by LH, building on advice of R. A. Fisher, as reported by Cochran (1965).

    4. Assess each evidence category for strength of association to each hypothesis, assigning a ranking of strong, medium, or weak to strength of association. This is a step that can involve considerable subjective judgment. It requires explicit specification of the rationale for strength of association rankings to ensure transparency in the abductive process.

    5. Organize the evidence categories by hypothesis into a matrix based on strength of association and *veritas* rank. Assign numerical scores to the evidence categories as they pertain to the hypotheses in accordance with a scoring scheme such as indicated in Figure 1. This numerical specification represents only one of a myriad of possible scoring schemes. What they should all have in common is the order relations among the cells in the table as reflected in the numerical ordering in Figure 1.

    6. With the numerical assignments at hand, we compute six summary statistics: (a) maximum score over all evidence categories; (b) minimum score over all evidence categories; (c) average score;

Veritas

FIGURE 1. Scoring scheme for association X *veritas* rankings.

(d) average score over evidence categories in the "minimally strong–support" cells (white background in Figure 1); (e) average score over evidence categories in "relatively strong–support" cells (shaded background in Figure 1); (f) percent of evidence blocks in strong–support cells. These statistics are calculated for the evidence categories relevant to individual hypotheses, to pairs of hypotheses, and to multiple hypotheses simultaneously, thereby producing summary scores of strength of support for all candidate hypotheses. This kind of scoring scheme was a useful device for showing discrimination among rival hypotheses on the basis of strength of evidence, including *veritas* rankings, in the CBW investigation of Katz and Singer (2007). It is by no means restricted to this kind of application. Indeed, all of the above steps were tested by Katz and Singer on some of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's detective stories involving Sherlock Holmes (Doyle 1998), multiple episodes of the television drama series *Law & Order*, and the evidence base for the Sverdlovsk (Siberia) anthrax attack of 1979 (Guillemin 1999; Wampler and Blanton 2001).

7. The strongest hypothesis identified with our numerical scoring scheme should be further checked for (a) consistency with the overall state of historical and scientific knowledge about the topic at hand; (b) satisfying guidelines for causation; (c) the possibility of satisfying the legal profession criterion "beyond a reasonable doubt."

The above steps represent one approach to abductive inference that we see as relevant for adding considerable specificity to

Implication Analysis. The substantial literature on natural language processing covers similar ground and invokes weighted abduction to deal with the *veritas* issues we have discussed above (Hobbs 2006). The intelligence investigation setting, and probably many complex sociological inquiries, will not lend themselves quite so readily to the extensive computerization of the expert systems designed for special purposes in fields such as molecular biology (Raychaudhuri et al. 2002; Chen and Altman 1999). However, the exercise of trying to develop computerized systems for abductive inference serves to enforce greater precision of thought about this mode of analysis, and especially to clarify where extensive subjective judgment must inevitably be invoked and where maximal transparency about investigator-based decisions is needed.

One final point that deserves a brief comment is the notion of causality. Despite the extensive, and heavily statistical, literature on this topic that pervades contemporary social research, there is an aspect of causality in the abductive process that tends to create a sense of unease among many investigators. In particular, conclusions derived in historical studies in sociology and in the CBW investigation referred to above represent the culmination of causal inferences from single novel events. The method underlying this culmination would seem to fly in the face of a large literature going back to David Hume ([1739] 1998) implying that cause is inferred from the "frequent co-occurrence (spatial and temporal) of two previously experienced events" (Hauser and Spaulding 2006:7181). A growing literature in psychology and neurobiology (Hauser and Spaulding 2006; Premack and Premack 2002; Michotte 1962) implies that "although Hume's logic was sound, his psychology was not: cause is often inferred by human adults and infants from single, novel events" (Hauser and Spaulding 2006:7181). The key point is that this form of causal inference is an unavoidable aspect of the analysis of evidence in many sociological contexts. We know very little at the present time about the evolution of our capacity to generate causal inferences, and this is an active research area (Hauser and Spaulding 2006). The uncertainties associated with this process, and with the evolving basis for establishing causal inference, even in the context of natural language processing (Hobbs 2005), are reflected in uncertainties about conclusions derived from the assembly of evidence according to steps 1–7 (above), or that might be carried out in future abductive inference frameworks.

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COMMENT: DISTURBING IMPLICATIONS

Charles Tilly*

Stanley Lieberson and Joel Horwich (this volume, p. 1) have packed plenty of wisdom into their reflective essay. It is certainly true, and insufficiently recognized, that sociologists can greatly expand both the power and the verifiability of their theories by multiplying the implications of the basic arguments across phenomena and observational sites.

Lieberson and Horwich's vigorous injunctions validate intuitions that have struck many earlier analysts of social phenomena. They are in fact nicely systematizing an approach that is already familiar to many experienced researchers. In his recent methodological textbook, for example, Arthur Stinchcombe offers related advice:

> The basic method of testing theories is to see whether or not their factual consequences are true. A combination of logic or mathematics and previously well-established ancillary theories (e.g., those embedded in measuring instruments) is used to "derive" hypotheses about what will be observed in a given situation (e.g., an experiment, a survey). Those hypotheses are then compared with the observations. The power of a test involves both the nature of the hypothesis (especially the solidity of its relation to the theory), its relation to competitive theories, its degree of resolution or exactness about what will be observed, and the like. In short, the amount

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> one learns from "Theory T implies hypothesis H, and
> observations O imply H is false (or H is true)" depends
> on many features of H. Thus, the key to methodologies
> of all sorts, when used for testing, is to maximize the
> impact of H (and so of the observations) on our belief in
> T. We might call this impact the "observational power"
> of the hypothesis, or the "power" of the observations
> to test the theory. (p. 18)

In addition to advocating the careful deduction of multiple observationally feasible conclusions from the theories at hand, Lieberson and Horwich wisely counsel researchers to specify the scope conditions of those theories—to which apparently relevant phenomena they actually apply. They also come close to making a point I cherish: that every researcher who draws conclusions from evidence is simultaneously deploying two interacting theories—a theory of the process under study and a theory of the process generating evidence concerning that process (Tilly 2004). If either one is crude or entirely implicit, the research results suffer.

Nevertheless, the Lieberson-Horwich version of this lesson, if taken seriously, will spread consternation in sociology dissertation committees across the land. Results of doctoral dissertations, after all, constitute a large share—I would guess about half—of all mainline publications in sociology. The Lieberson-Horwich program will therefore spread consternation because it contradicts advice that advisors commonly give sociology students who are trying to identify viable dissertation topics: Find an engaging, important, answerable question in the present state of knowledge that is sufficiently precise and narrow to permit you to gather relevant evidence, then perform the necessary analyses, and draw strong conclusions within a couple of years' work. Make a distinctive big bang to start your career. Lieberson-Horwich Implication Analysis implies that dissertations actually conforming to that frequent advice will take up no more than slivers of worthwhile questions and will not lead to productive careers in sociology. Dissertations, Lieberson and Horwich imply, are unlikely to produce big bangs, and pretentious dissertations will commonly produce big fizzles.

Instead, Implication Analysis encourages youngsters to make incremental contributions within well-developed fields. Notice the deflationary tone of Lieberson and Horwich's concluding paragraph:

> In the same way as the hard sciences evolve and develop through the efforts of worker bees, so too should the social sciences recognize that worker bees are adding to a well-structured problem and the outcome is the product of all of the work. Great People exist, but their theories, as well as their syntheses of the existing work, are open to modification and are neither proven nor disproven with a given data set.

Sociology doctoral candidates will not welcome comparison with worker bees.

The advice will therefore shake up advisors of doctoral candidates. As a veteran supervisor of doctoral dissertations in history and the social sciences, I remember my surprise when one of my daughters described how she had finished her Ph.D. in molecular genetics. She had joined a group of biochemists and biophysicists studying the effects of heat shock on genetic processes. She started at the bottom, assisting in experiments, signing papers far down in the queue, but working her way up toward the top, experiment by experiment and paper by paper. After a couple of years, one day her advisor called her in with this advice: Package the articles you've signed, write an introduction and a conclusion to the series of analyses, and we'll make that your doctoral dissertation. She followed the advice, then went on to a creative career in molecular genetics.

I suddenly realized that for all my personal commitment to intellectual collectivism, I had never steered my own students' dissertations in that way. I had avoided that close direction for fear of stifling my students' individual creativity and blocking their paths to distinguished careers. I often joined my students in decrying what we thought of as the "cookie-cutter" dissertations that emerged from social science shops in which a presumably authoritarian professor handed out complementary research assignments to a seminar's members and each new dissertation resembled the last except for substitution of a new variable or methodological twist.

That was, of course, my fault, not Lieberson and Horwich's. But it identifies some difficulties in the program of Implication Analysis. The program assumes two things that often fail to apply where and when sociology students begin doctoral dissertations: (1) a relatively dense field of accumulated knowledge and technique concerning the subject at hand, and (2) students who are willing to face the prospect of verifying or modifying theories that the current state of knowledge already treats as mostly true rather than pinning down a topic definitively. It assumes modesty and maturity concerning the impact of a single sociological contribution. Perhaps other readers of this journal have succeeded in finding or forming students who are willing to take up problems that will take several years to solve, and even then will only yield provisional, even contested, solutions. For the most part, I have not. Indeed, even in my own work it took me years to recognize that no single chunk of my research could set the whole sociological world on fire.

On the other hand, at times Lieberson and Horwich seem to assume that researchers have very large resources at their disposal. They point out correctly that if a theory works well for a given nation, when attempting to generalize it would be advantageous to generate a random sample of other nations with suitable data on which to try out the generalization. It often turns out, however, that the researcher has little choice: only a very small number of nations have generated "suitable data," often because they greatly resemble the nation with which the researcher began. When Robert Goodin and his collaborators seek to compare delivery of results by liberal, corporatist, and social democratic welfare regimes, they choose the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands as their examples (Goodin et al. 1999). They do so not because those are the quintessential representatives of the three types, but because the three provide approximately comparable longitudinal data on welfare outcomes, which no other candidates do. When I teach the book, my students predictably complain that Goodin et al. chose the wrong set of cases. Only when I point out the years and millions it would have taken for the team to generate comparable data for, say, Sweden or the United Kingdom do they begin to appreciate the constraints on feasible comparisons.

In short, before sociological thesis directors across the world adopt the full, wise program of Implication Analysis, they should reflect seriously on how they will motivate their students, and how direct

them to evidence they can feasibly collect and analyze in the few years of doctoral research.

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IMPLICATION ANALYSIS: RESPONSE TO THE COMMENTS

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1. RESPONSE TO SINGER

We are enthusiastic about Singer's proposal and the paper by Katz and Singer (2007). In his commentary, Singer describes a form of inference and a set of procedures that have been successfully used in other domains of investigation. Since it is designed to rigorously evaluate the quality of all of the data (both quantitative and qualitative) as well as to suggest the most appropriate theoretical solution, his proposal will be very appealing if it can be applied to social research. Accordingly, abductive inference and the procedures used in the Katz and Singer paper merit serious consideration in the social sciences. Singer offers us the prospect of combining a more rigorous evaluation of the quality of the evidence along with a more meticulous determination about the most reasonable conclusion. It is all the more appealing to us since the proposal is harmonious with our use of the jury trial (particularly in Part 8.2) as a metaphor for social research, where a jury tries to reach a conclusion about the conflicting theories presented by the prosecution and the defense with difficulty occurring because they are presented with contradictory and inconsistent evidence of varying nature and quality. (Incidentally, Singer's brief comment about the Ni Bhrolchain and Dyson [2007] paper does not do them justice. In our opinion, they are headed

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in the same direction, recognizing the challenge of piecing together a complex array of evidence of varying quality—what they describe as a *bricolage*.)

As Singer realizes, he may well be ahead of many of his readers (certainly us) in his employment of abductive reasoning. The application he cites (Katz and Singer 2007) deals with biological weapons, a topic that is quite remote—at least substantively—from the questions that social scientists normally pursue. In addition, the data that they employ (a large body of recently declassified information) are alien to us. Yes, we appreciate learning that the method also works very well with fictional mysteries (some of Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories and episodes from *Law & Order,* a fictional television series). But a fictional story usually has to be written so that the outcome is convincing—a requirement that is not automatically to be assumed in sticky and complex research problems. But, at the moment, these are minor matters. Although the Katz and Singer paper deals with some issues relevant to our questions, such as evaluating the quality of the data and connecting theories with a mass of information, its primary concern is obviously not to serve as a teaching tool for the method but rather to ascertain the most reasonable hypothesis about the use of chemical and biological weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Though it may be presumptuous of us to make this proposal, we suggest that Singer and his associates help us learn about this procedure. Both Singer's commentary and the Katz and Singer (2007) paper are forthright statements about various assumptions and subjective judgments involved in this developing area—certainly good starting points for the application of this method to the social sciences. Looking forward, however, more is needed. Perhaps Katz and Singer can present workshops at various social science annual meetings or publish elementary articles that walk us through the steps. An ideal paper would be oriented to social researchers that provides a step-by-step understanding of the method using all of the available data from an area in which there has been considerable evidence accompanied by an absence of resolution. (Of course, a description of necessary assumptions and estimates would be in order.) Not that the reader will need further reasons for considering this procedure, but we note with interest that the Katz and Singer paper (p. 26) describes a "seven-step strategy for integrating the complex mixture of qualitative and quantitative data and for

then establishing in a transparent fashion that one among a range of plausible hypotheses was best supported by available evidence."

So, Singer, you mention a set of tantalizing, yet unfamiliar procedures that have been successfully used in a variety of empirical areas. It would be a great help if you were to help us see the procedures' application to a social science problem, walking us through each step. Even if the devil is in the details, this is simply too promising a procedure to be passed over without a further exposition that is tailored to social research. We see the potential of what has been described by Singer's comments and the 2007 Katz and Singer paper and believe that it merits further consideration. Hopefully, our concerns will be met with a crisp and clear illustration that uses real social science data that have not been resolved.

2. RESPONSE TO FIREBAUGH

Firebaugh raises some deep issues. His discussion of nested theories raises questions about how Implication Analysis would actually work out in practice. This may be a cop-out, but it seems to us that there is no clear answer and, indeed, there cannot be one. In the case of smoking and lung cancer, Firebaugh mentions two possible questions: the narrower one involving the causal link between smoking and lung cancer and the broader question of the impact of smoking on health generally. Ideally speaking (and we realize that *ideally* merits italics), it should not matter which question one first pursues. Obviously the impact of smoking on lung cancer is more manageable, and that is fine, because it itself is a challenge to answer. If smoking turns out to be bad for lungs, then it should lead to efforts to expand this conclusion to other health consequence matters and on-and-on.

Here is where the worker bee metaphor comes in, though it can be misinterpreted rather easily. When we speak of worker bees, we have in mind the way a beehive is organized such that a wide variety of tasks are undertaken by different worker bees that collectively have the effect of maintaining the well-being of the colony. In social science, likewise, the enterprise benefits from the various activities we conduct. Presumably knowledge is being built and expanded as the collectivity works on its different tasks. Unfortunately, we have a problem—at least in sociology—because there is a resistance to viewing the work as part of

a collectivity effort. This is ironic since sociology would be the discipline most likely to understand the role of social organization. Instead, expanding a given result into other logical consideration tends to be viewed as unimaginative. We have learned to change our own thoughts on these matters. For example, the authors have gained an increasing appreciation of review articles. When they are done well—to wit summarizing existing knowledge, the issues waiting to be resolved, and the new unknown territories—it is a major contribution toward building the body of knowledge in a given area.

Turning then to residential segregation, probably the best bet is to recognize at the outset all of the possible "effects" that could be studied, then look at what is now known, and in turn choose one or a small number of domains to study. As a matter of fact, the problem is likely to be so complicated that a variety of studies—generated by more than one person or group—will be necessary just to deal with the implications for a specific facet of segregation.

In short, we are not inclined to deal with the question of the best strategy for applying Implication Analysis to nested theories. It all depends on what we currently know, which issues need resolving, or perhaps which areas of expansion are promising. It certainly depends on available funds. However, whether it is big science or small science, many issues of implication will require more than one researcher or one group. In any case, we agree with the compromise strategy described by Firebaugh.

We agree with Firebaugh that natural experiments have unrealized potential in social research; very likely there are more possibilities out there than people realize. And providing some good examples of natural experiments in sociology should stimulate social scientists— particularly graduate students—to think harder about finding applicable natural experiments. No matter what, one of our early points is relevant—to wit, social science methodology is not about developing a foolproof system; it is at least partly an art. There is not a mechanical system that will handle all of our goals. It seems to us that using some of these imaginative notions may stimulate others to think about alternate possibilities rather than simply jumping in with the conventional methods. In our response to Goldstone (p. 98), we provided an example of an implication described by Rubin (1984:43–44) to address the classic problem of using observational data to compare private school– public school impacts on students, when we know that the students are

massively different to begin with. We need to search for those pieces that display the best of this.

Responding to Firebaugh's comments about our use of the arsenic example in Turkey to deal with an alternative explanation of the linkage between smoking and lung cancer, it is true that a natural experiment does occur. As for whether it is a "crucial test," we had not viewed it as such, but we now can see a reason for doing so. To wit, given the massive amount of evidence in support of the theory that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, the single result on arsenic is sufficient to discount the arsenic thesis. On the other hand, if lung cancer was substantially less common among Turkish smokers, then further studies would be required. This is sort of a Bayesian approach to the problem.

As for the question about teaching Implication Analysis, Lieberson has been teaching a graduate seminar on evidence for many years at Harvard. It has evolved in the direction of including various studies that stimulate this way of thinking. During this semester, he has introduced material on the smoking–lung cancer studies to illustrate some superb research models. As for the question about logic, we are on the same wavelength. For a number of years, the course included several fallacies that are particularly widespread in social science thinking. This elicited a surprisingly high level of interest. In the last few years, an entire chapter on fallacies has been assigned from a book on logic. This includes, by the way, the various fallacies employed in sophistry. (We are bothered by the use of sophistry to create a hypothesis favoring the writer's position or, on the other hand, warping another position so as to make it untenable.)

Finally, as for causal mechanisms, Firebaugh is correct—we have not developed a sensible and consistent way of thinking about this.

3. RESPONSE TO MIZRUCHI

The senior author appreciates Mizruchi's kind remarks at the outset, particularly coming from someone with his many accomplishments.

Mizruchi asks if our comments, although true, propose procedures that are commonly known and followed. There is a distinction between what we know and what we do. We are sure the motorists who drive 60 mph in a school zone or run red lights know what they *should* be doing, but it is not what they *are* doing. On this score, Firebaugh's

response is relevant, based on his experience serving as editor of the *American Sociological Review*. He reports there is a widespread problem and therefore a valid issue—albeit agreeing that the best manuscripts do deal with the ramifications implied by the theory. Ironically, we will see that Mizruchi himself follows practices that violate some of the standards described in our paper. Before moving on, we do agree with Mizruchi's observation that we should have cited Rosenbaum's work as well as the work of others dealing with counterfactual models (for example, Morgan and Winship [2007]). We stand corrected.

As an alternative to Implication Analysis, Mizruchi asks: "is not examining an alternative causal theory precisely what the use of control variables does?" Mizruchi visualizes addressing the smoking issue with a "multivariate regression approach" to get at all the possible variables and their interactions with one fell swoop. We disagree on several counts. First of all, consider the statistical points raised by Winship and Sobel (2004):

> [I]t is standard to interpret the coefficient for a particular variable in a regression model as representing the causal effect of that variable on the outcome "holding all other variables in the model constant". . . .this interpretation is almost always unreasonable. The inferential task is difficult enough when there is only a single variable X whose causal effect is of interest. We view the all too common attempt when one has nonexperimental data to make causal inferences about a series of Xs within a single model as hazardous. The threats to the validity of such claims are simply too great in most circumstances to make such inferences plausible. (P. 494)

Put succinctly:

> Estimating the effect of a single variable (treatment) on an outcome is quite difficult. Attempts to estimate the effects of multiple variables simultaneously are generally ill advised. (Winship and Sobel 2004:499)

We will not belabor this discussion, but Mizruchi's proposed alternative is not viable—nor is it generally viable in sociological research. (See Freedman's discussion of the assumptions required [and usually not met] in the multivariate approach to causality ([1991 21:300–11].) By the way, the "controls" that Mizruchi describes being used in the analysis of smoking and lung cancer in many cases are not really alternative causes, but rather ways of learning more about the topic in hand and, to be sure, could possibly suggest further extensions. Certainly the last thing the epidemiologists had in mind, however, was a mechanical approach to causality such that one had a simple contest between causes leading to *the* cause (or causes). The control in itself does not in any way, shape, or form provide an alternative causal theory.

Here we provide brief answers to three other questions raised by Mizruchi:

- Observing that we fail to provide a single example of a sociological work that exhibits the faults that we attribute, he wonders why this is the case. After weighing various possibilities, he concludes that we had difficulty finding such an example. This is a fallacy of affirming the consequent, a fallacy widely committed in sociology.
- We had a specific reason for discussing in relatively great detail the two medical studies used in our paper. In both cases, the procedures generated firm conclusions, although using observational data of the sort that we are obliged to use. Moreover, the conclusions were eventually supported by biological experimental and interventional evidence. Hence, the initial procedures are, as it were, validated in a way that is rare for us.
- Scope conditions are tricky. First of all, the theory that "fails" has to be considered with the checklist that we developed toward the end of the paper. (Although this was ignored by the discussants, we hope that others will add to the checklist that we started.) Moreover, it is all too easy (and circular) to toss in scope restrictions when a theory that often "works" does not appear to hold up in some other circumstances. Rather than simply toss in this circular explanation, it would be productive to consider whether there are conditional assumptions in the theory itself (which had not yet been realized) that generate an understanding as to when the theory will apply.

4. RESPONSE TO GOLDSTONE

Goldstone argues that there is nothing surprising in our proposals. "[T]he *raison d'etre* of research programs is to elaborate the implications of their guiding theories, collecting evidence of varying types and qualities that confirms key tenets, and devising revisions and alterations and additions to the guiding theory when some implications meet with unanticipated results." Moreover, he asserts this is common practice among most sociologists as they go about "drawing out and collecting evidence regarding the diverse implications of varied conjectures and theories, or by confronting and rethinking our ideas based on new observations and novel ideas." This, of course, clashes with the observations in Firebaugh's comments based on his experience as editor of the *American Sociological Review*. So we might at least wonder: What are the grounds for Goldstone's conclusion about the widespread usage of our proposals?

Goldstone cites two books, one by Collins (1998) and the other by Charrad (2001). Yes, Collins has many cases in his book and Charrad deals with three countries, but that is besides the point. Implication Analysis does not simply mean you are interested in more than one case; it means evaluating the theory to see how well it holds under a wide variety of conditions and circumstances. Goldstone gives us not one specific reference in the work by Collins (a book in excess of 1,000 pages) where we could see the operation of any of the facets of Implication Analysis. And, likewise, he offers no specific example for the Charrad volume. Where should we look to find the detailed effort to use the checklist to evaluate the differences between outcomes? (For example, the three countries studied by Charrad appear to differ. Has the nature and quality of the data for each country been considered?) Where would we see the refined efforts to develop hypotheses that are appropriate for the ideas under consideration? Where is the view of the data as if it were a jury trial such that a set of inconsistent and contradictory data have to be weighed and balanced? We are not implying anything unfavorable about either work, and congratulate the authors for their honors. Rather, we are saying that if Goldstone wishes to use these books as examples of Implication Analysis at work, he must provide specific instances.

Goldstone inadvertently illustrates the difficulty in generating an appropriate deduction from a theory. He cites a few examples to counter the hypothesis he attributes to us—namely, that virtually nobody is

presently following the principles outlined in Implication Analysis. If that were true, then indeed a *few examples* that contradicted us would be in order. But that is not what we are saying. In fact, we have provided our own examples of sociologists seeking extensive implications. The flaw is that he distorts our position into a "straw man" that is easily disproved. In this case, this is exactly one of the flaws that we discuss in our paper—to wit, the difficulties involved in getting an appropriate deduction. He should look again at our discussion of *submerged statements* as well as the paper on the egregious use of examples (Lieberson 1998). Ironically, Goldstone has illustrated the importance of the distinction between *knowing* and *doing* which we mention in our response to Mizruchi.

Here is another example of the application of Implication Analysis that might help Goldstone understand the difference between what we have in mind and the assumption that a study with multiple cases is all that Implication Analysis requires. Donald Rubin (1984) describes the widely discussed obstacles in comparing the influence of public versus private schools on student achievement, given the strong likelihood that students in the two types of schools differ in other characteristics that may affect outcome (separate from the school effect). Rubin observes that in the Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore report (1981) "there were many outcome variables measuring different aspects of achievement. . .In particular, some outcome variables were based on material not taught in high school and other outcome variables were based on material typically taught in high school. If private schools are more effective than public schools, then the treatment effects should be larger for outcome variables with more high school material than outcome variables with less high school material" (Rubin 1984: 43–44).

Rather than just going ahead with a mechanical set of procedures, a way is proposed to sort out the influence of the two types of schools from the influence of the different sets of students who attend these schools. Namely, there are a number of attributes on which we would expect private school students to do better even though the topics are not taught. As a consequence, a comparison between that gap and the gap between students on topics taught in both private and public schools will give us some estimate of the school effect separate from the effect due to selectivity in the student bodies. This procedure demonstrates how different the customary practices are from analyzing the implications of a theory.

5. RESPONSE TO TILLY

We appreciate Tilly's enthusiastic comments about our paper, describing it as a reflective essay packed with wisdom. His subsequent observations are essentially peripheral to the point of the piece. If our discussion of Implication Analysis is of value for the interaction between evidence and theory, then it can be incorporated into the training of graduate students without the angst described by Tilly.

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